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SYSTEMIC SOCIAL MEDIA REGULATION 
FRANK FAGAN† 
ABSTRACT 
Social media platforms are motivated by profit, corporate 
image, long-term viability, good citizenship, and a desire for 
friendly legal environments. These managerial interests stand in 
contrast to the gubernatorial interests of the state, which include 
the promotion of free speech, the development of e-commerce, 
various counter terrorism initiatives, and the discouragement of 
hate speech. Inasmuch as managerial and gubernatorial interests 
overlap, a self-regulation model of platform governance should 
prevail. Inasmuch as they diverge, regulation is desirable when 
its benefits exceed its costs. An assessment of the benefits and 
costs of social media regulation should account for how social 
facts, norms, and falsehoods proliferate. This Article sketches a 
basic economic model. What emerges from the analysis is that the 
quality of discourse cannot be controlled through suppression of 
content, or even disclosure of source. A better approach is to 
modify, in a manner conducive to discursive excellence, the 
structure of the forum. Optimal platform architecture should aim 
to reduce the systemic externalities generated by the social 
interactions that they enable, including the social costs of 
unlawful interference in elections and the proliferation of hate 
speech. Simultaneously, a systemic approach to social media 
regulation implies fewer controls on user behavior and content 
creation, and attendant First Amendment complications. Several 
examples are explored, including algorithmic newsfeeds, online 
advertising, and invited campus speakers.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, during the ongoing wave of sexual assault claims 
involving celebrities, newscasters, politicians, and high-profile 
Hollywood employers, NPR’s All Things Considered ran a segment 
entitled, “Women Are Speaking Up About Abuse, But Why Now?”1 Why 
now is a good question. Sexual harassment has only been recognized as an 
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1 All Things Considered: Women Are Speaking Up About Abuse, but Why Now? 
NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/27/ 
560231232/women-are-speaking-up-about-harassment-and-abuse-but-why-now. 
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actionable form of discrimination just recently; socio-cultural advances in 
gender equality are relatively new phenomena.2 If anything, prior levels of 
abuse were at least as high as they are today—if not higher. So what 
explains the recent spike in claims? During the segment, Anita Hill 
conjectured that, “[since passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991], we have 
been raising children—daughters in particular—with the understanding 
that sexual harassment is illegal, shouldn’t be tolerated, and that it’s 
wrong.”3 In other words, law drives morality and norms, and it has finally 
led to concrete action twenty-five years later. Professor Hill is right to 
point out that lawmakers can shape social norms, which can lead to waves 
of litigation a generation delayed.4 Greater numbers of women are in 
college, working, and earning higher wages, and all of this too, has played 
a role. But is social media particularly adept at creating tipping points, and 
if so, how exactly does social media accelerate change?   
Legal scholars have explained how expressive laws, such as the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, check bad behaviors that are difficult or costly 
to detect.5 New laws that express social values make it easier for victims 
to speak out against social wrongs, lowering overall enforcement costs; 
they raise public awareness of social problems, increasing the number of 
people who sanction a wrongdoer; and shine spotlights on particular 
issues, increasing the probability that public enforcement resources will be 
allocated in the first place. And at times, new laws actually define what is 
morally right and wrong a priori. Lawmakers function as “norm 
entrepreneurs” who proclaim and calibrate social values, intuitions, and 
morality.6 Normative claims, embodied in new laws, can generate “norm 
cascades” and “norm bandwagons,” which quickly lead to new forms of 
social behavior.7 Cass Sunstein, Richard McAdams, Bob Cooter, and 
others have written extensively on how these patterns unfold and what they 
mean for law.8  
                                               
2 See CATHERINE MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 34–43 (2007) 
(documenting the recognition of sexual harassment and assault as legal claims of 
sexual discrimination). 
3 NAT’L. PUB. RADIO, supra note 1. 
4 See infra § IV.B. 
5 A good example is Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995). 
6 See id. at 1019 (providing examples). 
7 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
903, 912 (1996) (explaining that rapid shifts in new norms help explain the 
attack on apartheid in South Africa, the fall of Communism, the election of 
Ronald Reagan, and the rise of the feminist movement).  
8 See, e.g., id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Unleashed, Aug. 22, 2017, 
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This Article aims to add to that body of work in several ways. 
First, it incorporates the role of social media into the analysis of norm 
evolution and explains its bearing on law. While the analysis of analog 
social networks is as old as society itself,9 their digital counterparts 
generally accelerate, and in some cases make possible, the cascade and 
bandwagon effects described by Sunstein and others. To support this 
claim, this Article develops a basic economic model that describes the 
creation and proliferation of social facts, norms, and falsehoods, general 
enough to account for citizens, lawmakers, and social media platforms 
acting as norm entrepreneurs. By working through the details, this Article 
provides a clear rationale for systemic social media platform regulation. 
Several important policies are taken up, including how governments 
should regulate algorithmic news feeds and online advertising, and how 
universities should regulate the promotion of controversial speakers 
organized by students.   
In brief, factual and normative evolution begins with a person or 
lawmaker who claims that some fact is true, or that a given behavior is 
morally wrong. Because social media platforms control the flow of content 
manufactured by people and lawmakers, platforms function as norm 
entrepreneurs as well, which, at least from a functional standpoint, is at 
odds with § 230 of the Communications Decency Act.10 A key component 
of this Article, therefore, is to explore the communicative role of platforms 
by clarifying how claim proliferation depends on their architecture. What 
emerges from the analysis is that regulation, when warranted, should focus 
on platform architecture and not platform speech. This conclusion is 
consistent with § 230 inasmuch as platform liability would be based upon 
violations of systemic rules rather than responsibility for speech.   
Regardless of who is responsible for the origination of a factual or 
normative claim, claims can spread leading to new patterns of behavior 
and social enforcement. For instance, lawmakers recognized sexual 
harassment as a social wrong when they passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1991. Validity claims are also made by friends, law professors, media 
executives, foreign agents purchasing a Facebook ad—essentially anyone 
                                               
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3025749; RICHARD A. MCADAMS, THE 
EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS 42 (2015) (describing the 
informative and focalizing effects of norms and the relevance to law of these 
effects). 
9 Aristotle’s Politics suffices for documenting the analysis and recognized 
importance of social networks in the ancient world. See generally ARISTOTLE, 
POLITICS (R.F. Stalley ed. Ernest Barker trans. Oxford Univ. Press Release ed. 
2009) (c. 350 B.C.E.). 
10 See infra § IV.C.  
No. 1]      DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 396 
 
who can be heard. When claims stick, they are replicated over social 
networks and unleash norm cascades.  
The principal difference between analog and digital social 
networks is that the latter consist of broad and horizontal membership 
across narrow attitudes and beliefs. While the bonds between social media 
platform members are often thin, platform architecture supports greater 
volume and breadth when compared to traditional social networks. Norm 
entrepreneurs who effectively tap platform networks and make their 
claims “go viral,” exercise marginal de facto rulemaking, fact-making, and 
potentially outsized influence in socio-legal activities such as national 
elections.11 It is true that rumors, and remedies for injurious rumors, are as 
old as the wellsprings of common law,12 but platforms can accelerate, and 
in some instances make possible, the proliferation of defamatory and other 
types of facts. Moreover, facts have lifecycles. They proliferate when the 
social network that they harness is systemically strong and resilient to 
counter-facts, falsehoods, and other forms of declaratory corruption.  
The proliferation of a fact or norm, or a particular version of 
either, is valuable to the extent that it changes behavior, and this value can 
accrue to both private entities and the state alike. Social media platforms 
such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter pursue managerial interests, 
which include profit, corporate image, long-term viability, good 
citizenship, and friendly regulatory environments. These stand in contrast 
to gubernatorial interests, which are pursued by governments, and include 
the promotion of free speech, the development of e-commerce, counter 
terrorism initiatives, and the discouragement of hate speech.13 Inasmuch 
                                               
11 In some cases, non-digital social networks can be large, narrow, and dense. 
Consider that Italy’s top three television broadcasters, controlled by Silvio 
Berlusconi, were able to reach nearly the entire electorate with a narrow 
message that was consistently replicated. See Rachel Sanderson, Berlusconi 
Study Sheds Light on Politics and Profits, FIN. TIMES, (January 4, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/eb86eb6c-d284-11e6-9341-7393bb2e1b51 
(documenting Berlusconi’s control of Mediaset and its use to continually 
message a national audience during his campaigns for Prime Minister). The 
point is that social media platforms generally exhibit these structural features. 
12 See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 436-46 (4th 
ed. 2002) (noting that defamation torts were subject to the jurisdiction of 
English ecclesiastical courts prior to the 17th century and then transferred to 
common law courts). 
13 To be sure, platforms engage in private governance when they choose to 
suppress or permit speech. See Jack Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic 
Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 
UC DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2018) (noting that a practical ability to engage in 
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as managerial interests and gubernatorial interests overlap, self-regulation 
maximizes social welfare so long as the interests themselves are 
efficient.14 Inasmuch as they diverge, regulation can be socially useful if 
its benefits exceed its costs. Some of the features of current proposals, such 
as the one advanced by Senators Klobuchar, Warner, and McCain15 
(KWM) intuitively track this approach. One of the aims of this Article is 
to provide some theoretical underpinnings for the KWM proposal, and 
similar ones, grounded in microeconomics and social psychology.  
Assertions of factual or moral validity, when systemically spread 
throughout social media, can eventually lead to unconscious compliance 
and instinctual self-regulation. While this type of evolutionary path takes 
a substantial period of time to complete, construction of deep policies and 
normative legacies may be the only path available to lawmakers in 
polarized political environments; or when enforcement costs of legal rules 
are so excessive, lawmakers may have no options for generating 
compliance other than nurturing moral instinct.16 These longer-term 
pathways toward deep policy and unconscious compliance can help 
explain attitudes toward immigration, climate change, and religious 
expression in contexts such as the creation of wedding cakes for 
celebrating same-sex marriages.17 It should be obvious that the 
construction of deep policy is not the only way to shape social attitudes or 
                                               
speech acts is subject to the private decisions of platform owners, which 
amounts to private governance). For clarity, this Article treats platform 
governance, or private content moderation, as a means by which platforms 
pursue their managerial interests. For instance, a platform may suppress hate 
speech in order to attract and keep users or avoid regulatory interference. When 
doing so, this Article considers that platform as pursuing its managerial 
interests.  
14 Recent scholarship suggests that policymakers should recognize the intricate 
content moderation systems already in place and concludes that law should take 
self-regulation efforts into account when considering policy. See Kate Klonick, 
The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online 
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1666 (2018) (“[A]ny proposed regulation . . . . 
should work with an understanding of the intricate self-regulatory structure 
already in place . . .”); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 
106 GEORGETOWN L. J. *11 (2018) (“Whether we decide to regulate platform 
censorship or leave it to the market, the decision should be considered”). 
15 The Honest Ads Act, § 1989, 115th Cong. (2017). 
16 Cf. FRANK FAGAN, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT: TEMPORARY 
VERSUS PERMANENT LEGISLATION 105 (2013) (providing empirical support for 
the notion that the difficulty of passing laws in some domains is more difficult 
than others). 
17 See infra § III.B.3. 
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obtain desired legal outcomes. In some instances, however, construction 
of deep policy is possible and defensible within a welfarist, rational-choice 
framework. Exploring and developing this approach has important 
implications for the regulation of social media. To the extent that long-
term managerial interests consist of the development, moderation, and 
shaping of public opinion over time, the government has a weaker basis 
for platform regulation, at least if that basis is grounded in First 
Amendment doctrine.18 By contrast, when the benefits of speech 
suppression are certain and immediate, the basis for platform regulation is 
stronger, though direct confrontation with First Amendment principles can 
be avoided through a systemic regulatory approach. 
Social norms, of course, have historically been the domain of 
sociologists, who have described compliance behavior in contrast to 
consequentialist conceptions of rules as prices.19 For them, rules can 
operate in gray areas as integral parts of social processes that prompt self-
regulation either through stabilizing existing patterns of rule-based 
behavior, or through transforming widespread ideas of what is the 
appropriate mode of interaction.20 Surprisingly, a number of contemporary 
economists view compliance as a result of some mix between regulatory 
deterrence on the one hand, and relational obligation, socialization, 
reputation, legitimacy, and other phenomena stemming from social 
interaction on the other.21 Even within law and economics, whose 
consequentialist tradition naturally embraces “expected punishment” 
explanations of compliance, there has arisen a large project aimed at 
understanding the interaction between social norms and the law.22  
                                               
18 Infra § IV.A. 
19 See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 2 (8th ed. 
1938) (contrasting obedience with the law to the coercive power of moral 
maxims and “the public conscience [which] exercises a check on every act 
which offends it by means of the surveillance it exercises over the conduct of 
citizens”). 
20 See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. 2 144 (1990) 
(theorizing that modern compliance regimes achieve success by transforming 
ideas of appropriateness). 
21 See Jon G. Sutinen & K. Kuperan, A Socio-Economic Theory of Regulatory 
Compliance, 26 INT’L J. SOCIO-ECON. 174, 175 (1999) (presenting a model of 
compliance behavior where rational agents are motivated extrinsically and 
intrinsically); GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 162 (1998) 
(developing a model of economic behavior where agents derive utility from 
social interactions). 
22 See the essays collected in SOCIAL NORMS, NON-LEGAL SANCTIONS, AND THE 
LAW (Eric A. Posner ed. 2007). See also the Journal of Legal Studies 
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Nonetheless, leading theory in law and economics can sometimes 
lack clarity and full elaboration. It often provides a muddled price-
theoretic explanation for adherence to social norms: people derive 
consequential utility from acting virtuously, even when their virtuous 
actions are so obviously averse to their interests along other dimensions.23 
For example, a generosity norm confers utility on practitioners of self-
sacrifice and altruism, or a norm of environmental stewardship confers 
“psychic” utility even though stewardship may be monetarily costly and 
offer few individual rewards in both the short and long run. Nearly always, 
foundational norms like generosity, and others that generate psychic 
utility, are described as preexisting or rooted in evolutionary biology.24 
That law and economics scholars have had little to say about how 
foundational norms can be created by instrumentally driven agents may be 
due to an intuition that guiding unconscious social norms toward 
normative ends with deep policy can be easily short-circuited with 
conscious rules; or perhaps it is due to the idea that welfarist guidance of 
instinctual behavior may otherwise have little payoff in terms of social 
value because of time and discount rates.25  
                                               
symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economics Analysis of Law, 
27 J. LEG. STUD. 537–823. An important early contribution that describes the 
ability of law itself to create and modify social norms is Robert Cooter, 
Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998). See also Robert 
Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000). For 
a recent restatement and expansion of the theory and its limits, see generally 
MCADAMS, supra note 8. 
23 This approach has invited numerous critiques and outright dismissal. See, e.g., 
Elizabeth Anderson, Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in 
Theories of Social Norms, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 170, 193 (2000) (arguing that a 
desire for identification with a group can explain the motive to comply with a 
norm). 
24 One strategic explanation for the existence of other-regarding behaviors that 
run contrary to self-interest is that they function as impulse-control devices and 
signal commitment to shared long-term goals with potential partners. Thus, 
moral emotions and feelings are instrumental towards achieving particular ends. 
See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF 
THE EMOTIONS 211 (1988). On how evolutionary biology has shaped norms, see 
PAUL BLOOM, AGAINST EMPATHY 170 (2017) (noting that “[w]e are naturally 
kind because our ancestors who were kind to others outlived and outreproduced 
those who [were not],” and that “[this] doesn’t mean that when people help 
others they are thinking about survival and reproduction”). 
25 Note that this thinking closely tracks First Amendment doctrine and its apathy 
toward suppressing speech on the basis of non-immediate effects. See infra § 
IV.A. 
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Even if either of those intuitions are true, an instrumental 
explanation for the origin of unconscious normative behavior can bring 
coherence to consequentialist theories of social norms and can present 
opportunities for deep social welfare maximization. Rather than stripping 
social norms (and their attendant morality) of their independence and 
reducing them to a master concept of utility, providing an instrumental 
account actually has the opposite effect here. Deeper understanding of the 
pathways toward unconscious behavior, cast in rational-choice terms, 
frees up conceptual space for the construction of deep policies that elicit 
unconscious compliance while respecting self-interest precisely because 
the interests are constructed with citizen input.26 Moreover, a deeper 
understanding of the micro-foundations of social contagion is fundamental 
for addressing the systemic risk generated by social media. 
The key is to develop a thorough understanding of how platforms 
shape social facts and norms. Platforms obviously represent important 
pathways into conscious opinion formation, but existing proposals for 
intervention (or self-regulation) can benefit from explicitly 
acknowledging the deeper, unconscious attitudes and behaviors in play. 
By unpacking how platforms systemically generate attitudes and beliefs 
through social channels, linkages, sequesters, and quarantines, the 
externalities generated by social media come into full focus. 
Providing a detailed theory of the creation of social facts, norms, 
and falsehoods may give the impression of excess or intellectual 
overindulgence. On the other hand, a theory of social behavior, with 
respect to media, obviously seems necessary for developing a systemic 
approach to the regulation of social media—especially one that avoids 
being under-inclusive, but perhaps more importantly, avoids being over-
inclusive by taking seriously the shaky claim that impostors and 
dissemblers can control public opinion and social facts.27 Norm 
entrepreneurs require more than just a low-cost platform that can reach 
many people. They must make claims that resonate throughout a social 
network and trigger sticky patterns of approval, disapproval, pride, and 
                                               
26 Interesting complications for welfare analysis arise when the democratic input 
of a current generation binds a future one. See Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore, 
Legislative Sunrises: Transitions, Veiled Commitments, and Carbon Taxes, 
FRANK FAGAN & SAUL LEVMORE, THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 130, 133–37 
(2017). 
27 Cf. FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF 
BIG TECH (2018) (noting that “if we want to be melodramatic about it, we could 
say Facebook is constantly tinkering with the quality of news and opinion that it 
allows to break through the din, adjusting the quality of political and cultural 
discourse”). 
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guilt that burrow deeply into the social experience.  
II. SOCIAL NORMS AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
A.  Attitudes and Compliance in a Vacuum 
Compliance behavior is created. Typically, in law, creation is 
more or less immediate. Lawmakers produce rules backed by sanctions, 
which generate rule-following behavior.28 Otherwise, creation takes time, 
and in some cases, so much time, that a proclivity toward compliance 
appears endowed or the result of a protracted evolutionary path.29 While 
recent advances in theoretical biology acknowledge that we “think fast”, 
and that fast thinking occurs independently of slow rational-choice-style 
thinking,30 as will become clear, none of this has much to do with deeply 
ingrained and morally charged norms like generosity toward migrants and 
strangers, stewardship toward the environment, or social attitudes toward 
the separation of church and state. People do not think fast about these 
issues. For a given set of relations among people, and a given span of time, 
the underlying claims and rationales for thinking a particular way either 
operate primarily in the socially cognitive foreground, where discourse 
and messaging explicitly recognize the role that norm entrepreneurs and 
social networks play in shaping group attitudes and beliefs, or they operate 
in socially cognitive backgrounds where inconspicuous claims and 
rationales can, oftentimes, continue to generate strong compliance and 
attitude-shaping effects. Put differently, compliance and beliefs can be 
conscious or unconscious, but in either case, they are the fruits of utility-
seeking norm entrepreneurs who have leveraged social networks.31  
                                               
28 For this discussion, it is useful to set aside other purposes for rules, such as 
enabling cooperation and coordination through bodies of law like contracts, 
corporations, trusts, and estates and to focus exclusively on generating 
compliance with commands backed by threats. The distinction between law as a 
command and law as a coordination device is elaborated in H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 26 (2d ed. 1961). 
29 For instance, Adam Smith notes that: 
[M]en are naturally endowed with a desire for the welfare and 
preservation of society; but the Author of nature hasn’t left it to men to 
use their reason to work out what kinds and levels of punishment are 
right for this purpose; rather, he has endowed men with an immediate 
and instinctive approval of just precisely the kind and level of 
punishment that is most proper to attain it. 
ADAM SMITH, A THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS II.i.5.10 (1759). 
30 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 19 (2011). 
31 Throughout this Article, social networks refer to online and offline groups of 
people who are connected through social contact and exhibit some level of 
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A social attitude toward immigrants, monuments, single-payer 
healthcare, wealth disparity, and other politically charged issues begins, at 
some point in time, with a single claim made by a norm entrepreneur.32 
This is true for attitudes toward contestable facts as well. The norm 
entrepreneur might be a law professor, an acquaintance or parent, a 
lawmaker, an evangelist, an industry leader, or an agent for a foreign 
power.33 Norm entrepreneurs make validity claims through a medium. For 
instance, the law professor may claim that immigration policy should 
embrace open borders through a lecture, or a parent may claim that 
generosity should be shown only toward friends and family during dinner-
table conversation. Likewise, foreign agents may claim that a particular 
candidate is corrupt through a Facebook ad. Inasmuch as social media 
platforms control the flow of validity claims, they too, function as norm 
entrepreneurs. 
In each instance, the norm entrepreneur makes a claim that 
attempts to persuade the listener of its validity. In a vacuum, the strength 
or magnitude of validity is based exclusively on the listener’s existing 
beliefs.34 If the student holds weak personal views on immigration and 
                                               
density greater than zero. For a given context, social media refers to online 
social networks (groups of people), the content contained on those networks, 
and the platforms which provide the space for the people to connect and share 
content. 
32 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, A THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, VOL. 1 8–9 
(1981) (theorizing that norm entrepreneurs make “validity claims,” or assertions 
that are accepted or not accepted as true by other individual persons and that 
claims are ultimately validated or invalidated by a society through a series of 
communicative actions). For an early elaboration of this idea, see SMITH, supra 
note 29 at I.i.3.2 (noting that to approve or disapprove of another’s opinion is to 
adopt or not adopt those opinions). 
33 For the proposition that lawmakers create social norms, see Lessig, supra note 
5 at 1019; see also Emmanuela Carbonara, et al., Lawmakers as Norm 
Entrepreneurs, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 779, 779 (2008) (developing an economic 
model of legislative norm entrepreneurship); infra § IB. V. For the proposition 
that social media platforms create social norms, see infra § IV.C. 
34 Thus, a person’s susceptibility to a claim, at a given moment in time, is based 
upon all of the previous claims that she has processed and how those claims 
have been refined and shaped by her experiences. Younger people are generally 
more impressionable because they have processed less claims. See SMITH, supra 
note 29 at I.i.3.10 (noting that people evaluate the communicative acts of others 
through comparisons to their own experiences and thinking). Note that this 
approach is consistent with contemporary theories of the mind. Materialist 
theories that understand all human experience as the result of electrical activity 
in the brain, and view all output and thinking as the result of stimulus and input 
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believes that the law professor is authoritative and trustworthy, then she 
may accept the claim as true. The same claim made by a long-standing 
acquaintance may have less (or more) persuasive power. On the other 
hand, the authority of the norm entrepreneur may matter little. If the 
Surgeon General makes a claim that smoking leads to bad health, but 
supports that claim with state-of-the-art scientific evidence, then the 
listener may accept that claim as valid despite what she thinks of the 
Surgeon General. Similarly, if an accomplished climatologist makes a 
claim that global surface temperatures are rising, a voter may reject that 
claim despite what she thinks of the climatologist or the scientific 
evidence.35 Much like a judge considering the validity of a fact or expert 
testimony, a person considering the validity of a claim made by a norm 
entrepreneur evaluates its truth based upon its substance and the credibility 
of the speaker, and that evaluation itself is set against a backdrop of 
existing beliefs of what is true substance and what constitutes a reliable 
signal of credibility.36 
Once a claim is made, a listener may reject it outright, and the 
claim may die immediately. The recipient, for example, may simply reject 
                                               
(just like a computer), are perfectly compatible with the idea that people process 
claims based upon the sum of their previous experiences. See generally, 
STANISLAS DEHAENE, CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE BRAIN: DECIPHERING HOW THE 
BRAIN CODES OUR THOUGHTS (2014); STEPHEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND 
WORKS (1997). This approach also leaves space for theories that presuppose a 
preexisting genetic memory or naturally endowed morality; people would 
simply process validity claims against the backdrop of their current moral-
mental state. See PAUL BLOOM, JUST BABIES: THE ORIGINS OF GOOD AND EVIL 
218 (2015) (noting that we are born with “empathy and compassion, the 
capacity to judge the actions of others, and even some rudimentary 
understanding of justice and fairness”).  
35 Cf. Cary Funk, How Much Does Science Knowledge Influence People’s Views 
of Climate Change and Energy Issues?, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (March 22, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/22/how-much-does-science-
knowledge-influence-peoples-views-on-climate-change-and-energy-issues/ 
(noting that heightened science knowledge may have no discernible effect on 
beliefs that climate change is due to human activity). Receptivity toward 
scientific claims are discussed infra at § III.B. 2. 
36 Automated content moderation works the same way. An algorithm makes 
programmed determinations of the appropriateness of user-posted content such 
as photos based upon an existing database of illegal images. See Klonick, supra 
note 14, at 1636–37. Human moderators follow internal rules for making 
determinations of the appropriateness of content that includes ambiguities. Id. at 
1638–39. For instance, a photograph may be classified as nudity or art based 
upon existing beliefs of what constitutes art. 
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the claim that a presidential candidate is in bad health because it does not 
comport with her existing beliefs, and an anonymous norm entrepreneur 
making a claim through a dubious Facebook ad does not persuade her 
otherwise. Or she may hold no existing beliefs about the candidate at all, 
but does not consider any form of political advertisement credible, so that 
advertisements in general make no impression upon her. Possible 
explanations may be that she currently accepts that most political news is 
fake, foreign agents have interfered with social media, or people should 
ignore political messaging entirely. All of this leads her to remain immune 
to the claim of bad health made by the norm entrepreneur.  
B.  Attitudes and Compliance in a Network 
While existing beliefs may cause a person to reject or accept 
claims in a vacuum, where disapproval, approval, guilt, and pride play no 
role, the calculus changes entirely once a claim passes through a person’s 
social network. Once placed on a network, a validity claim generates 
second-party enforcement through social approval or disapproval, which 
in turn, generates conscious, voluntary compliance with rules or provokes 
the adoption of social attitudes.37 Validity claims, and patterns of approval 
and disapproval, can additionally generate sources of guilt and pride. For 
now, it is useful to set guilt and pride aside given that second-party social 
sanctioning can generate compliance and shape social attitudes entirely on 
its own. For instance, a civic leader may claim that strict border control is 
wrong because the United States is an immigrant nation, a model of 
humanitarianism, that it can lead more strongly through benevolence, and 
that the socio-economic benefits from enhanced diversity inure to society 
broadly. People who speak out, against immigration, can experience social 
approval or disapproval insofar as members of their social network 
approve or disapprove of the civic leader’s position. Approval and 
disapproval depend upon the systemic composition of one’s social 
network. Thus, demonstrated opposition to a claim can carry benefits from 
peer-approval and costs from peer-disapproval, and these are determined 
by the speaker’s social network.38  
                                               
37 Thus, internationalization of claims and social sanctioning is not necessary for 
generating compliance and the adoption of social attitudes. Insofar as internal 
and external sanctioning are aligned, the former amplifies the effects of the 
latter. This point is developed in Part III, infra. 
38 People attempt to influence the composition of their networks in order to 
maximize net approval benefits. See Sinan Aral, et al., Distinguishing Influence-
Based Contagion from Homophily-Driven Diffusion in Dynamic Networks, 106 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 21544, 21544 (2009) (finding evidence that similarities 
among people drives more than fifty percent of behavioral contagion in online 
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Faced with peer benefits and costs, a person’s utility is plainly 
shaped by their choice to oppose or support a claim initiated by the norm 
entrepreneur.39 Consider that the entrepreneur, perhaps again citing to an 
authoritative study, may claim that organized football is dangerous for 
brain health. Under the gaze of friends or outspoken strangers, one may 
experience little to no disapproval, and may actually be rewarded with 
approval for ignoring the claim and its supporting research.40 Different 
configurations of social networks may generate compliance or non-
compliance. While the son of a neurologist may have difficulty mustering 
the courage to join the high school team, the son of a Heisman Trophy 
winner may experience disapproval for willfully avoiding participation. 
Presumably the son cares about his father’s approval, but his network is 
larger. He must contend with his mother, his classmates, and indeed 
everyone with whom he has contact that may approve or disapprove of his 
decision. Through feedback, his entire social network bears on his choice 
to participate to the extent that he values their net approval. If we divide 
his utility into two parts, the first a measure of his enjoyment from playing 
football independent of his relationships with others, and the second a 
measure of enjoyment from playing strictly derived from his personal 
relationships, it is easy to see how his social network can change the 
outcome of his choice.  
1. Speaking Out: Sexual Harassment in a Network 
Similarly, the recent spike in public allegations of sexual 
harassment and abuse brought against public figures can be explained, in 
part, through the rise of social media platforms. While threats of 
retaliation, secret settlements, and other forms of discouragement can 
suppress claims, social media encourages them. Socially isolated claims, 
as opposed to socially networked claims, carry less probability of success. 
In isolation, no discernible pattern of misconduct can emerge. In a 
vacuum, perpetrators face no external consequences from others or law, 
which increases their capacities for retaliation, and in turn, chills claims. 
Even within a social network, retaliation can occur to the extent that the 
incident itself is quarantined and its validation relies on the credibility of 
the victim. Powerful perpetrators, acting within analog social networks 
where approval and disapproval flow more vertically and less horizontally 
                                               
networks). 
39 Note that a norm entrepreneur can change the calculus of actual behavior, 
which can lead to real compliance with a rule and not just vocal support of a 
contested policy. 
40 Lawrence Lessig discusses a similar example with hockey helmets in Lessig, 
supra note 5 at 967. 
No. 1]      DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 406 
 
amongst its members, can marshal social interactions to their advantage.41 
Network members who value the approval of perpetrators will refuse to 
validate the claim of a victim and may even make efforts to protect or 
support the perpetrators.42 When perpetrators cannot resort to vertical 
social networks, they can rely on secret settlements that prohibit the victim 
from publicizing a claim. Commentators point to the superior bargaining 
power of perpetrators and the likelihood that secret agreements consist of 
lop-sided terms.43 An additional problem is that secrecy obscures patterns 
of misconduct that would otherwise be uncovered had a claim been fully 
litigated.44 Because patterns remain hidden, other claimants are unable to 
assess the full value of secrecy and properly deter serial harassers.   
Given continued fears of retaliation, the endurance of vertical 
social networks that reward enablers, and the use of confidential 
settlements to silence victims, consider again the question of “why the 
wave of claims now?” Sexual harassment has been condemned, especially 
in the work place, for at least several decades.45 While lawmakers and 
parents have clearly functioned as norm entrepreneurs, the key to 
understanding the cascade of claims is the emergence of social media 
platforms which have flattened social network membership. Unlike 
vertical networks, which enable retaliation and suppression of claims, 
                                               
41 See Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey 
Weinstein’s Accusers Tell Their Stories, THE NEW YORKER, (Oct. 23, 2017) 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-
sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories (noting that Harvey 
Weinstein orchestrated negative press coverage of his accusers in order to 
impugn their credibility). 
42 See, e.g., id. (noting how Weinstein would orchestrate meetings with multiple 
assistants known as “honeypots” and then dismiss them from the meeting in 
order to isolate a victim). 
43 See Daniel Hemel, How Nondisclosure Agreements Protect Sexual Predators, 
VOX (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/9/ 
16447118/confidentiality-agreement-weinstein-sexual-harassment-nda. 
44 See Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil, 
Criminal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 311 (2018) 
(noting this problem and suggesting that sunshine-in-litigation laws should 
mandate semi-confidentiality, or revelation of the facts of a settlement, but not 
its terms). 
45 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (providing rights to 
sue and collect compensatory and punitive damages for workplace sexual 
harassment); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co. 139 F.R.D. 657, 667 (D. Minn. 
1991) (certifying a class of alleged sexual assault victims); Oncale v. Sundower 
Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (permitting claims against perpetrators of 
the same sex). 
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horizontal networks diffuse power by multiplying sources of social 
sanctioning. These sources, while distributed broadly, provide immediate 
feedback that is disconnected from the influence of the perpetrator. 
Consider the victim’s choice to publicize an episode of sexual harassment. 
She may fear retaliation, but the attendant emotional and financial costs 
are more likely to be balanced by social support and the validation of the 
truth of her claim. Social media acquaintances reiterate her experience 
through redundant messaging, sometimes anonymously, which in each 
instance, confers approval benefits and validates her claim. Moreover, 
existence of a horizontal network increases the likelihood that she can find 
meaningful work beyond the reach of the perpetrator’s influence and can 
avoid being blacklisted. Note, too, that the social network which provides 
these benefits to her can weaken the vertical influence of the perpetrator. 
Enabling assistants and dishonest publicists face greater levels of 




Figure 1: Passage of Validity Claims through Vertical and Horizontal 
Networks 
 
Several decades ago, most victims could only make validity 
claims over analog networks, which more often exhibit vertical 
membership and are more susceptible to control by the injurer as a result. 
                                               
46 This is true to the extent that they are members of the horizontal network that 
is willing to sanction them. Broad network membership is a necessary condition 
for broad social sanctioning. 
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With the emergence of social media platforms, victims can pass validity 
claims through horizontal networks, which have increased the magnitude 
of approval benefits for speaking out and the likelihood that claims are 
validated. Reinforcing patterns of approval, enabled by horizontal network 
architectures, make it more likely for claims, and the norms that they 
embody, to go viral. The normative conclusion is that systemic rules that 
support horizontal network architectures are desirable when enforcement 
is costly, and in particular, when detection costs are excessive. Even if 
more victims are speaking out now because of higher levels of workforce 
participation and gender balance, horizontal network structures increase 
the likelihood of accruing net benefits from doing so.  
2. Online Advertising, Algorithmic News Feeds, and Voter Attitudes 
In the same fashion, the voter, who maintains no opinion of a 
candidate in isolation, may change her attitude when confronted by a web 
of connections, likes, and retweets. Of course the geographic 
concentration of voting preferences has long existed prior to social media 
platforms, though this might be characterized as an outcome of shared 
economic interests vis-à-vis geographic competitors; however, social 
media platforms, with their sprawling architectures, can amplify existing 
forms of concentration and create new ones, especially along non-
economic dimensions where geographic competition for resources is less 
important. For instance, various hashtag campaigns related to social 
policies such as parental rights to raise genderless children, elimination of 
aggressive policing, and provision of safe spaces for sharing experiences 
of sexual violence have had broad geographic appeal (despite 
concentrations in urban centers) and have made at least a marginal impact 
on state legislatures.47  
Where geographic concentration of voter preferences discourages 
support for those policies, social media platforms provide approval 
benefits across physical distances that can tip support in local referendums 
and elections. These effects mirror those experienced with the growing 
syndication of television and radio broadcasting in the past.48 However, a 
                                               
47 See, e.g., Tanya Sichynysky, These 10 Twitter Hashtags Changed the Way We 
Talk About Social Issues, THE WASHINGTON POST, (Mar. 21, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/03/21/these-are-the-
10-most-influential-hashtags-in-honor-of-twitters-
birthday/?utm_term=.0da730336fa9 (describing the broad appeal and success of 
various hashtag campaigns). 
48 See Adam Candeub, Media Ownership Regulation, the First Amendment, and 
Democracy’s Future, 41 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1587, 1603 (2008) (noting 
that geographic markets are largely delineated by federal and state law through 
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key difference is that broadcasting requires significant investment and 
involves institutional gatekeeping through shareholder pressures and 
governmental licensing.49 As a result, the pool of norm entrepreneurs who 
leverage traditional media to make validity claims over networks is 
decidedly smaller. While these opinion-makers wield substantial 
influence, institutional gatekeeping exerts pressure on the contents of their 
messages.50 Thus, the political claims made within analog networks are 
restricted and more tightly controlled. With a narrower set of ideas 
competing for validity, people place a higher value on the personal 
qualities of the norm entrepreneur when validating across claims, leading 
to phenomena such as celebrity newscasters. Social sanctioning, as a 
result, tends to flow more vertically and less horizontally.   
By contrast, norm entrepreneurs who make claims by leveraging 
social media make use of horizontal and open network structures. While 
this has created space for a greater number of entrepreneurs and can dilute 
the strength of messaging, it has simultaneously increased opportunities 
for aggregating previously untapped approval benefits and has led to 
greater instances of validation of factual and normative claims (including 
false ones) which would have been otherwise contained by the 
geographical dispersion of social approval benefits.51 But the most 
                                               
spectrum allocation and cable franchise, and discussing the reduction of cross-
ownership prohibitions and the explicit rejection of a judicial basis of 
“viewpoint diversity”). 
49 See Peter J. Alexander & Keith Brown, Policy Making and Policy Tradeoffs: 
Broadcast Media Regulation in the United States, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION 
OF BROADCASTING MARKETS 255, 258–59 (noting that media firms face large, 
up-front fixed costs); see also Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has 
Done (To American Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 205 (2018) 
(noting that barriers to entry into media have dropped and this has amplified 
concern for misinformation and propaganda). 
50 Apart from accountability exerted by shareholders and licensors, broadcast 
communications are highly public and subject to greater levels of scrutiny by the 
press, fact-checkers, and political opponents. Social media communications, in 
contrast, are often directly aimed at groups segmented on the basis of private 
information held by the social media platform. See The Honest Ads Act, § 1989 
*5 (2017); see also Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and 
Influence Campaigns, Hearing Before Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
115th Cong. 30–41 (2017) (statement of Clint Watts, Robert A. Fox Fellow, 
Foreign Policy Research Institute) (comparing broadcast news that is difficult to 
manipulate because it requires actual control of the organs of media with social 
media news that is easy to manipulate because it requires no control, it is not 
curated, and is conducive to rapid proliferation).  
51 More precisely, untapped approval benefits were contained by a lower level of 
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significant difference for existing law is that a larger pool of norm 
entrepreneurs can now leverage social networks, albeit open and 
horizontal ones, without being subject to institutional accountability. A 
reduction in institutional accountability through the avoidance of 
traditional gatekeepers is additive with a reduction in personal 
accountability through the ability to remain anonymous.    
The Klobuchar, Warner, and McCain proposal essentially 
mandates disclosure and unmasks the norm entrepreneur. Facebook and 
Google users are accustomed to seeing their newsfeeds and search results 
as an organic flow of communications. KWM would alert users to 
communications that have been disguised as organic but are actually paid 
political advertisements.52 It additionally requires the disclosure of who is 
paying for those advertisements. The underlying premise, which mirrors 
the existing rationale for regulating offline political advertising, is that 
people evaluate the credibility of validity claims based upon substance and 
source. The idea that the source matters is the lynchpin of contemporary 
ethics in journalism.53 Sourcing enlarges accountability. By doing so, it 
guarantees a baseline level of truthfulness in reporting, enhances 
democratic discourse, and raises the quality of political candidates. In the 
long run, sourcing nurtures robust political institutions. However, these 
                                               
density of social relationships. To the extent that analog social networks exhibit 
a high level of density, they too, generate the effects observed over high-density 
digital social networks. Higher levels of density generate higher levels of social 
interaction, which lead to marginal increases in social sanctioning and resultant 
fact and norm proliferation. See Yoshinobu Zasu, Sanctions By Social Norms 
and the Law: Substitutes or Complements?, 36 J. L. STUD. 379, 379 (2007) 
(providing a model where increased density and social interaction leads to 
higher levels social sanctioning and normative behavior).  
52 In addition to disclaimer requirements, KWM mandates the creation of a 
public database of online political advertising purchased by advertisers who 
spend more than $500 per year and sold by social media platforms with more 
than 50 million unique U.S. visitors per month. The Honest Ads Act, § 1989 *6 
(2017). The databased must include a copy of the ad, identification of the target 
audience, the number of views, the first and last time the ad was displayed, and 
the name and contact information of the purchaser. Id. The purpose is to allow 
watch-dog organizations to offer near real-time accountability. See Yochai 
Benkler, Election Advertising Disclosure: Part 1, HARV. L. REV. BLOG, (Oct. 
31, 2017), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/election-advertising-disclosure-
part-1/. 
53 Society of Professional Journalists, Code of Ethics, 
https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (noting that journalists should “identify 
sources clearly” and “[c]onsider sources’ motives before promising 
anonymity”). 
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effects assume that people evaluate factual and normative claims on the 
basis of careful reasoning. Recent studies in social psychology 
demonstrate that people assess claims, especially political ones, more 
often as members of a team.54 Instead of forming political attitudes and 
beliefs on issues like health care, global warming, and immigration by 
deliberating facts, people act more like sports fans. When people are 
rooting for the Cowboys or Patriots, they do not engage in rational 
deliberation; they are simply expressing loyalty to a team. Paul Bloom 
explains that “[t]o complain that someone’s views on global warming 
aren’t grounded in facts, then, is to miss the point”55—political views 
should be understood “not as articulated conclusions, but rather as ‘Yay, 
team!’ and ‘Boo, the other guys!’”56      
Inasmuch as political discourse resembles a team sport more than 
rational debate, social media platforms cannot manipulate how its users 
appraise political facts and norms. Increasing institutional and personal 
accountability can do little to change minds. It seems highly unlikely, for 
instance, that expectations of a criminal indictment would persuade a 
Trump supporter to convert to Team Clinton or vice-versa. To be sure, 
social media platforms can engage in hyper-targeting and enable their 
advertisers to stoke fears and rouse anger within narrowly segmented 
groups.57 But as group membership thins, it becomes increasingly likely 
that views cannot be changed. This is a direct result of systemic network 
composition and architecture: within a narrow subnetwork, peers are more 
likely to confer approval benefits and less likely to confer disapproval 
costs.58 Undecided voters, or perhaps independents, are far more likely to 
                                               
54 See Philip M. Fernbach, et al., Political Extremism Is Supported by an Illusion 
of Understanding, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 939, 939 (2013). 
55 BLOOM, supra note 24 at 236. 
56 Id. 
57 See, e.g., Kurt Wagner, Facebook’s Reliance on Software Algorithms Keeps 
Getting the Company into Trouble, (RECODE, Sept. 14, 2017, 9:44 PM), 
https://www.recode.net/2017/9/14/16310512/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-
algorithm-ad-targeting-jews (noting that Facebook enabled advertisers to target 
users based on racist attitudes). 
58 Hyper-targeting of ads and extreme personalization of news generally 
increases group polarization and reduces meaningful engagement “across the 
aisle” with ideas. See Cass R. Sunstein, Guest Post: Is Social Media Good or 
Bad for Democracy?, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, (Jan. 22, 2018) 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/01/sunstein-democracy/; see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 175, 175 (2002). 
However, it is unclear whether observations of greater polarization are the result 
of disinhibition toward revelation of true preferences in the context of a safe and 
approving atmosphere. 
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be persuaded by political messaging, but this group is simultaneously far 
less likely to be algorithmically identified as a worthy recipient of a 
dubious ad. Moreover, undecided voters are more likely to engage in 
deliberate reasoning as opposed to political team sports; they consequently 
view dubious ads with higher levels of suspicion. Note that ongoing 
maintenance of an advertisements database, such as the one envisaged by 
the KWM proposal, may reduce instances of hit-and-run political 
advertising, but do little towards increasing the quality of political 
discourse. Polarized groups will simply debunk or vindicate the archived 
advertisements according to their preexisting tastes. On the other hand, if 
debunking will reduce a tendency to view untruthful advertisements, 
independent of preexisting tastes, then the database may be helpful toward 
reducing the impact of inflammatory ads ex post and their creation in the 
first place.59 Either way, effective regulation should target the composition 
of teams, especially if the social psychology research is correct.  
One approach could be to limit the types of groups that may be 
algorithmically identified and available for impression. As the target group 
widens, the likelihood increases that patterns of approval will be checked 
with patterns of disapproval, and that false claims will fizzle out. By 
backward induction then, the number of weakened claims will decrease. 
This approach has several design advantages. First, it side-steps the 
argument sometimes raised by social media platforms that online 
advertising is too short to include a full disclaimer.60 Second, it is 
impervious to botnets, sockpuppets, and other types of synthetic social 
                                               
59 This is because content producers would have no incentive to produce ads that 
generate no income. See Samanth Subramanian, Inside the Macedonian Fake 
News Complex, VOX, (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-
macedonia-fake-news/ (noting that the income is derived from impressions). 
While the reduction of inflammatory ads may have no impact on persuading 
core supporters, it can, over time, increase the overall quality of political 
discourse if reduction leads to greater levels of rational deliberation and truth-
seeking. See Benkler, supra note 52 (noting that an effective database could 
keep campaigns more honest and constrained, by allowing internet users “from 
professional journalists and nonprofits to concerned citizens with a knack for 
data, to see what the campaigns and others are doing, and to be able to report on 
these practices in near-real time to offer us, as a society … the ability to 
understand who, more generally, is trying to manipulate public opinion and 
how”).  
60 See Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK, (Sept. 21, 2017), 
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10104052907253171 (promising that 
going forward, Facebook will disclose the identity of the advertiser and that it 
will provide a link to a page displaying all of the advertisements a particular 
advertiser is running to any audience on Facebook). 
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behavioral marketing that are more or less resistant to the effects of 
disclaimer requirements.  
Finally, it avoids chilling speech. Critics of KWM and similar 
proposals argue that disclosure regulation flouts First Amendment 
principles and will stifle speech.61 By shifting regulatory focus away from 
the speaker and toward questionable forms of user segmentation, 
regulation of online advertising would track existing rules against racial 
and other forms of group profiling. Admittedly, in commercial contexts, 
these rules have been primarily applied to economic actors who, among 
other things, deny services to members of a protected class.62 A narrowly 
tailored systemic prohibition against segmenting users into hate groups 
and offering advertisers access to them would likely survive rational 
scrutiny. Enhancing the quality of political discourse or minimizing 
outside interference in electoral processes are legitimate government 
interests; and it is especially difficult to classify the groups, or their 
advertisers, as protected classes. In any case, Facebook has already 
implemented internal rules against targeting racist groups identified by its 
algorithm, though it remains unclear how the rules will be applied over 
time. It is important to highlight what, exactly, the rules do: they 
essentially subject advertisements that would experience net approval 
within a targeted subnetwork to a broader group of people who 
disapprove.63 Instead of suppressing platform speakers, they configure 
                                               
61 See, e.g., Eric Wang, Analysis of Klobuchar-Warner-McCain Internet Ads 
Legislation (S. 1989, 115th Cong.), 2017 INST. FREE SPEECH 1 (asserting that 
legislation which attempts to limit foreign influence by broadly regulating free 
speech will burden online political speech).  
62 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) 
(noting that laws which impact ordinary commerce, including freedom of 
contract, are unconstitutional unless they rest upon a rational basis; while 
economic regulations that “prejudice . . . discrete and insular minorities” require 
greater scrutiny when the prejudice “tends seriously to curtail the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities”). 
63 Note that this approach targets the demand-side, that is, the consumers of 
political advertisements, and can be supported by additional efforts to combat 
computational propaganda directed at the supply-side such as: requiring users to 
identify themselves to the platform and authenticate their accounts before being 
permitted to post publicly anonymous content; limiting the number of posts that 
can be made by a single account within a specified time frame; and using human 
verification systems like (CAPTCHA) to combat automated messaging. See 
Terrorism and Social Media: #Is Big Tech Doing Enough?: Hearing Before 
U.S. Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 115 Cong. 3 
(2018) (statement of Clint Watts, Robert A. Fox Fellow, Foreign Policy 
Research Institute). 
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platform architecture more widely to generate a mixed network 
composition, which reduces the incentive to produce inflammatory speech 
in the first place. 
1. Social Media and Campus Speech 
Once a norm entrepreneur makes a validity claim that has 
persuaded at least one person, that person acts as an enforcer of the 
entrepreneur’s opinion or norm to the extent that she publicizes her 
approval to others. She can also enforce contrary opinions and norms by 
publicizing her disapproval. Oftentimes, enforcement is costly. The 
persuaded individual, who is unsure of the reaction that her social approval 
or disapproval may generate, will fear a negative response from members 
of her social network. She may fear backlash and disapproval for being 
preachy or for taking a position that she erroneously believes to be 
consistent with her network. Or enforcement may be costly simply for the 
time it takes to write an opinionated message to a friend, police a lengthy 
Twitter account or Facebook News Feed with likes, or bother with an 
apathetic acquaintance or unknown stranger. To be sure, technology has 
reduced the economic costs of social enforcement dramatically. No longer 
does one need to draft a letter to the editor, appear at the town square for 
an evening passeggiata, or travel door-to-door with a petition to publicize 
one’s views and change social attitudes. At the same time, a tweet, a like, 
or the casual retweet can carry less opprobrium or validation than the 
lengthier face-to-face exchanges of yesteryear, though not always. 
Today’s social networks are large, provide immediate feedback, and can 
appear downright sincere when its participants broadcast intimate personal 
details.64 These features, among others, generate meaningful second-party 
enforcement that shape social attitudes and social norm compliance. As 
the sanctioning strength of a social network increases, taking a position on 
behalf of a norm entrepreneur becomes costlier, not just in terms of time 
                                               
64 See Anna M. Lomanowska & Matthieu J. Guitton, Online Intimacy and Well-
Being in the Digital Age, 4 INTERNET INTERVENTIONS 138, 139 (2017) (noting 
that online interactions can mirror levels of intimacy of offline interactions, and 
that in some contexts, “can actually accelerate intimacy formation in 
comparison”). Consider that pop-stars Erykah Badu and Jay Electronica tweeted 
4595 “protected” followers, that is, only those Twitter users who have chosen to 
follow them (as opposed to any Twitter user), live descriptions of the delivery of 
their baby. See Jayson Rodriguez, Erykah Badu, Jay Electronica Blog Child’s 
Birth in Real Time on Twitter, MTV NEWS, (Feb. 2, 2009), 
http://www.mtv.com/news/1604057/erykah-badu-jay-electronica-blog-childs-
birth-in-real-time-on-twitter/. As Lomanowska and Guitton emphasize, sharing 
intimate personal experiences such as childbirth increases the sincerity of online 
interactions. See Lomanowska & Guitton, supra note 64 at 139. 
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and effort, but also for the negative response it may produce. Policing a 
validity claim may elicit a net positive response as well. Networked 
acquaintances who approve of supporting or opposing a claim provide 
increased utility and satisfaction to the enforcer.65 Inasmuch as the benefit 
from receiving aligned social responses exceeds the costs of eliciting them, 
people will continue to engage in second-party enforcement.  
Seeking positive responses and avoiding negative ones leads a 
person to choose like-minded acquaintances and generally select a 
network composition that reflects her personal beliefs. Note that this 
network-selection behavior is entirely rational and helps explain why 
social networks systemically exhibit high levels of herding and 
polarization, and why they tend to aggressively reinforce existing patterns 
of belief. In addition to network selection, contemporary platform 
architecture dramatically limits the disapproval costs that users face. 
Social media platforms steer users toward upvotes and likes (and away 
from downvotes and dislikes), and obscure information about being 
unfriended or blocked by another.66  
Historically, universities have fostered political speech partly for 
the values and ideas that flourish there, but also because there exists a 
density of social interactions amongst students who share those values and 
ideas. Students who protest for or against providing a platform to a visiting 
speaker incur few costs and receive nearly certain benefits from their 
respective social networks.  While university speech regulations 
concerning time, manner, and place limit speech activity so as to minimize 
conflict among the university body and interference with university 
responsibilities,67 this policy implies that threat of disruptive protest is 
                                               
65 See SMITH, supra note 29 at II.iii.2.1 (noting that the love of praise and the 
dread of blame motivates action). 
66 For instance, Facebook users can only unlike comments, photos, or posts that 
they have previously liked. See How Do I Unlike Something?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/226926007324633?helpref=uf_permalink (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2018). Because of the time and complication associated with 
discovering who has unfriended or blocked them on Instagram, Facebook, and 
Twitter, interested users typically resort to third-party apps. See Joe McGauley, 
How to See All the Jerks Who Unfriended You on Facebook, THRILLLIST, (Dec. 
23, 2016, 2:46 PM), https://www.thrillist.com/tech/nation/how-to-see-who-
unfollowed-you-tracking-friends-on-instagram-facebook-and-twitter. 
67 See, e.g., Berkeley Campus Regulations Implementing University Policies, 
Section 300, Regulations Concerning Time, Place, and Manner of Public 
Expression, BERKELEY – UNIV. OF CA, http://sa.berkeley.edu/uga/regs., (last 
updated Aug. 23, 2011) (stating that its regulations concerning time, place, and 
manner of public expression are designed to prevent interference with the 
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increasingly successful the more likely it disrupts campus life. Moreover, 
disruption provides increasingly large social approval benefits to its 
members as a social network increases in size and narrows in viewpoint.68 
Simultaneously, counter-protestors who organize for continuance of the 
speech experience inverse benefits and costs. Given the zero-sum nature 
of campus conflict, net social benefits are a function of the size of the two 
opposed groups, and efficiency—at least in the short run—generally 
favors the preference of the larger group.69 
To the extent that protest generates conflict, the students 
externalize a number of costs that are incurred by the university. The most 
prominent are monitoring and security costs. Ideally, these would tend 
toward zero, which explains why norm entrepreneurs and lawmakers 
invest in norms that establish procedural excellence and promote rational 
deliberation within fora.70 On the other hand, there has been a turn in social 
attitudes amongst student bodies, which is reinforced by heightened social 
network density through the use of social media, that sound university 
procedure must prevent the circulation of hateful substance.71 Insofar as 
this approach generates lasting social benefits, it may be efficient over 
time. Even so, if taken to its logical limits, universities can no longer 
exclusively rely upon time, manner, and place restrictions for making 
determinations of permissible speech. Given a university policy to prohibit 
disruptive speech, such restrictions will only continue to have bite on 
campuses inasmuch as the students themselves embrace the speech as 
substantively valid and refrain from disruption.72 Again, it bears emphasis 
                                               
university’s conduct and affairs). 
68 Disapproval costs from taking a contrary view increase in addition. 
69 Group size may matter little for long-run efficiency if the views of the 
majority lead to a residual social benefit or cost 
70 Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 599–600 (5th ed. 
1998) (noting that the economic goals of civil and criminal procedure are to 
minimize errors of judgment and the costs of administering law). For an early 
modern historical account of the limitations of discursive excellence toward 
solving social problems, see TERESA M. BEJAN, MERE CIVILITY: DISAGREEMENT 
AND THE LIMITS OF TOLERATION passim (2017).  
71 See ERWIN CHERMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 
13 (2017) (noting that in contemporary campus speech issues, “it is the students 
who demand that the campus take action against speech they find offensive”). 
72 To remain consistent with the First Amendment, schools must be careful to 
base their decisions to prohibit speech on disruption of student learning and 
school environments and not on the offensive character of speech contents. See 
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011), (ruling a 
MySpace chat group which encouraged vulgar and offensive comments about 
another student not protected because the distress it inflicted caused school 
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that granting de facto adjudicatory power to the students may be socially 
efficient in the short run if a majority disfavors the speech. In the long run, 
efficiency requires that disruption lead to a lasting social benefit.73  
One clear area for university action is to curb norm entrepreneur 
activity that provides few social benefits to students and accomplishes few 
long-run social goals, and is instead aimed at increasing monitoring and 
security costs incurred by the university and degrading procedural norms. 
When unfriendly outsiders organize a protest, and perhaps a counter-
protest at the same time, their agitation efforts are unambiguously meant 
to drive up institutional costs and reduce the quality of discourse. As 
recently seen in Texas, foreign agents were able to organize two-sided 
protests through Facebook advertising for $200.74 If we loosely delineate 
                                               
disruption), cert denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue 
Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 928 (3d Cir. 2011), (finding a phony 
MySpace profile created by student to ridicule school principal protected under 
the First Amendment because the spoof profile did not substantially disrupt 
student learning and school environment), cert denied, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012); 
Padgett v. Auburn Univ., Case No. 3:17-CV-231-WKW (M.D. Ala. 2017) 
(protecting speech because university prohibition was unlawfully based upon its 
offensive content); see also Erwin Chermerinsky, Hate Speech is Protected Free 
Speech, Even on College Campuses, VOX (Dec. 26, 2017), 
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/16524832/campus-free-speech-
first-amendment-protest (referencing the Padgett case and noting that the 
Supreme Court has consistently held that public institutions, including 
universities, cannot prohibit speech on the basis that it is deeply offensive); see 
also Robert C. Post, There Is No 1st Amendment Right to Speak On a College 
Campus, VOX (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-
idea/2017/10/25/16526442/first-amendment-college-campuses-milo-spencer-
protests (noting that “[t]he limits on the university’s ability to regulate the 
speech of its students are . . . demarcated by the limits of its educational reach 
over students”).  
73 An analysis would track basic First Amendment policy where the chilling of 
speech is weighed against the probabilistic outcome that the speech creates an 
even greater social loss. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 
1950) (J. Learned Hand) (explaining that courts must in each case “ask whether 
the gravity of the ‘evil’, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion 
of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger”), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
See also infra § IV.A. 
74 Though this example did not occur on a campus, it is instructive. See Natasha 
Bertrand, Russia Organized Two Sides of a Texas Protest and Encouraged ‘Both 
Sides to Battle in the Streets’, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Nov. 1, 2017, 1:25 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-trolls-senate-intelligence-committee-
hearing-2017-11 (reporting Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Burr 
estimating costs of agitation at $200). 
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two social networks, one for the protestors, and one for the counter-
protestors, each member’s welfare is obviously enhanced by increased 
approval benefits and avoidance of disapproval costs by participating. 
Protest participants receive nearly certain social approval benefits within 
their respective social networks, but these tend to be outweighed by 
externalized security costs and manufactured institutional decay. Only if 
the two networks were systemically unified would there be opportunities 
for simultaneous approval and disapproval, which would, in turn, reduce 
the likelihood of the occurrence of the costly protest and counter-protest. 
This means that university policies which foster the creation of plural 
network membership reduce susceptibility to institutional attack. For 
instance, political advertising could be confined to a campus-wide 
Facebook or Kialo page.75 By restricting political advertising to a broadly 
viewed page, the university can drive convergence of approval and 
disapproval within a singular platform location to the extent that its student 
body is relatively balanced with multiple views.76 Guaranteeing that the 
advertisements are targeted broadly to the entire university body may be 
costly but perhaps not prohibitive. Of course to the extent that Facebook 
and other platforms prohibit advertisers from targeting hate groups as 
suggested in Section II.B.2, the probability of agitation within isolated 
social media platform locations, and the consequent increases in 
monitoring and security costs incurred by campuses, decrease.  
III. SOCIAL NORMS AND THE SELF 
A.  The Emergence of Guilt and Pride 
Because social networks provide approval and disapproval 
benefits and costs, they can change attitudes, calibrate beliefs, and make 
compliance with newly created norms (or old ones) go viral. In addition, 
they can generate compliance with legal rules. Rules that are rarely 
enforced by law, because of problems with detection or because the costs 
of bringing a claim are greater than the relief sought, can be enforced with 
                                               
75 For an overview of Kialo, a social media platform that splits arguments into 
binary “for” and “against” trees to enable apprehension of opposing views and 
encourages users to rank arguments on the basis of their reasoned qualities, see 
Jonathan Margolis, Meet the Startup that Wants to Sell You Civilized Debate, 
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/4c19005c-ff5f-11e7-
9e12-af73e8db3c71. 
76 Efforts toward curbing external costs might be additionally supported through 
the creation of content aimed at reducing hate speech through programs like 
“Creators of Change”. See Creators of Change, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/yt/creators-for-change/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2018).  
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social sanctions.77 The non-recycler who routinely ignores local 
regulations may begin to recycle when confronted by neighbors; or the 
parent may attempt to control a troublesome child more in public than at 
home. And to the extent that a would-be serial harasser is a member of a 
robust network that disapproves, he too, is more likely refrain from asocial 
misconduct. None of this is surprising or novel, but it lays the foundation 
for what happens next, when sanctions of approval and disapproval 
enforced by others transform into sanctions of personal guilt and pride 
enforced deliberately by one’s self.  
Carrying out social sanctioning can be costly for the enforcer. 
While social media platforms have dramatically reduced the necessary 
time and effort, enforcers can, nonetheless, experience meaningful costs 
when their sanctioning backfires and generates negative reactions 
throughout their network even though these are limited by platform 
architecture.78 Enforcers sanction then, when the expected value of 
sanctioning is positive. They weigh the benefits, which are composed of 
some measure of how deeply they care about the propagation of a social 
attitude or norm, and the expected net approval benefits that accrue to them 
when they disseminate it. Because net approval benefits are reduced by 
any backlash disapproval that the enforcer thinks could be forthcoming 
from her network, second-party social sanctioning tends to peter out.  
When people come into contact with a validity claim that they 
accept as true, they can develop sources of internal sanctioning that are 
strictly independent of other people’s beliefs.79 For instance, a person who 
accepts the claim that the Earth is warming due to human activity can feel 
internal pride from accurately recycling. She may carefully sort the plastic 
from the paper not because she is under the watchful gaze of a stranger or 
friends, but because she internally reflects upon her beliefs and 
experiences emotional benefits from taking a consistent action. Once she 
posts a selfie, seated beside two piles of plastic and paper, she is 
positioning herself to receive probabilistic approval benefits from her 
network. If she is running late, and simply disposes of the recycling 
unsorted, she experiences internal guilt. A friend who catches her in the 
act, and posts a photo on Instagram, may generate disapproval costs 
inasmuch as her network disapproves. Two points are of interest. First, her 
                                               
77 See Cooter, supra note 22 at 1597 (noting that intimate relationships are a 
primary influence on a person’s character); Zasu, supra note 51 at 379 (noting 
that informal sanctions can substitute for law). 
78 See supra note 66. 
79 See SMITH, supra note 29 at Part I.iii.1 (noting that systems of internal 
approbation and self-love are based on reason and sentiment). 
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internal guilt or pride for accurately recycling is the result of earlier work 
completed by a norm entrepreneur. Second, once a claim is internalized, 
internal sanctioning is not probabilistic because it does not depend upon 
the actions of others. While approval and disapproval may or may not be 
forthcoming given prevailing attitudes and the composition of her 
network, her internal guilt and pride is certain.80 This point matters. It 
means that enforcers of validity claims can reliably economize on costs.  
Even when facts and norms are widely accepted and sanctioning 
is unlikely to trigger backlash, enforcement still requires time and effort. 
More importantly, enforcement of broadly accepted norms within a 
network can generate disapproval because it can signal that the norm has 
not been fully internalized by the speaker. For instance, explicitly 
disapproving of a norm against holding out religious beliefs in a 
commercial setting on a particular message board might actually signal 
that the enforcer considers doing so an option.81 Other complexities related 
to the sincerity of the sanction, such as the enforcer’s timing and context, 
may generate disapproval as well. Sounding insincere, preachy, or out of 
touch, carries a cost. Thus, even though expected backlash may approach 
zero as the fact or norm becomes more widely held, there is always a non-
zero probability of disapproval. For this reason, levels of second-party 
social sanctioning fade, not so much for changing tastes or the reduced 
salience of a once important issue, but rather for the emergence of lower-
cost enforcement via guilt and pride. Recycling still matters, but enforcers 
can rely on sources of internal guilt and pride and simultaneously avoid 
appearances of insincerity, arrogance, or ignorance. 
It should be clear that the deterioration of approval and 
disapproval may not occur for every social attitude and norm. When 
internalization of a claim is slow or non-existent over a network, then 
social enforcement will generate net benefits for enforcers who care 
deeply about a fact or norm (so long as expected costs are sufficiently 
low). In those cases, patterns of approval and disapproval will subsist, but 
it bears emphasis, that in other cases, it makes economic sense for patterns 
                                               
80 This is true so long as the norm prevails internally within the individual. If a 
norm entrepreneur makes a new validity claim, which unseats the underlying 
fact or norm that is driving an individual’s pride and guilt, then the previous 
norm no longer prevails and guilt and pride sanctioning will lapse. However, it 
is incorrect to say that a fixed and prevailing norm that has been internalized 
generates expected values of guilt and pride. So long as the norm is internalized, 
guilt and pride are certain by definition. 
81 Cf. SETH STEPHENS-DAVIDOWITZ, EVERYBODY LIES 11–12 (2018) 
(highlighting the complications of uncovering true preferences on the basis of 
search results). 
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to dissolve. At dissolution, the underlying norm remains supported by 
internal sanctioning and continues to exert compliance and attitudinal 
effects.    
B.  The Emergence of Unconscious Compliance 
As facts and norms become more deeply internalized, rational 
individuals can maximize their return from holding beliefs and complying 
with norms by forgetting that they once required first-party enforcement 
to conform. A person who gives up smoking may feel a sense of pride 
from declining a cigarette within the first few years of quitting, when the 
chemical and psychological urges are still strong. But a former smoker 
who declines a cigarette a decade later experiences less pride if any at all. 
Economists would say that the marginal benefits of pride decline over 
time.82 Moreover, engaging in pride (or guilt) to generate compliance or 
conformity with a social attitude may itself be costly inasmuch as it recalls 
an earlier calculus that tolerated non-conformity as an option. A former 
smoker who declines a cigarette while pregnant for instance, may 
experience guilt for recalling that she once considered smoking while 
pregnant an option, and may avoid rewarding herself with pride. This is 
not to say that all norms and attitudes eventually become unhinged from 
first-party enforcement. The point is simply that sometimes, forgetting that 
one was guilty or prideful can be a rational decision aimed at maximizing 
the benefits of internalization.83 Over time, this form of psychological 
evolution can, in some instances, generate involuntary and unconscious 
compliance with normative behaviors (and apparent acts of self-sacrifice), 




Figure 2: How Social Norms Go Viral84 
                                               
82 See BECKER, supra note 21 at 50. 
83 Id.; see also Gary S. Becker, Habits, Addictions, and Traditions, 45 KLYKLOS 
327, 327 (1992). 
84 Approval, disapproval, guilt, and pride are denoted A, D, G, and P. 
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It is important to keep in mind, however, that unconscious 
behavior and attitudes can be set in motion by rational maximizing norm 
entrepreneurs. Consistent with their financial and social goals, norm 
entrepreneurs invest in validity claims to the extent that they expect a 
positive return on their claim-making investments.85 This instrumental 
account of norm creation and evolution can be used to help explain a 
number of phenomena, including differences in attitudes toward 
immigration, climate change, and church-state separation. Before turning 
to these examples, it is useful to sketch a basic three-part taxonomy. It may 
be said that shallow norms operate on the surface of social networks. They 
subsist primarily on the basis of approval and disapproval and tend to 
decay at a relatively high rate. As a result, they generate lower returns. 
Deep norms rely jointly on external approval and disapproval as well as 
internal pride and guilt. Because these norms have socially matured, they 
often decay at lower rates and generate higher returns to the norm 
entrepreneur. Unconscious norms operate on the basis of rational 
forgetfulness and are rarely conscientiously challenged. They decay at the 
highest rate, and require the highest level of investment to dislodge.  
1. Immigration 
Social attitudes toward immigration are shaped by norm 
entrepreneurs and second-party enforcers. There are a number of 
instrumental reasons why entrepreneurs and enforcers may want to shape 
societal views toward immigration. They may believe that diverse 
societies hold the greatest prospect for lasting peace and human progress; 
they could be concerned with international competitiveness in the face of 
declining population growth within their nation; perhaps they may 
represent a narrow set of interests that prefer higher or lower levels of 
competition for jobs amongst workers—both skilled and unskilled; or they 
may have internalized a generosity norm in the past and, as a result, benefit 
from professing compassion to strangers. In all likelihood, a desire to 
express an attitude toward immigration is based upon some combination 
of reasons, these and others, and has been developed with great nuance.  
Given the salience of validity claims made in relation to 
immigration in contemporary political discourse and communication, 
norms and attitudes are clearly operating at the shallow or deep level. To 
the extent that each person in a society feels guilt or pride for holding pro- 
                                               
85 For social media platforms, returns include profit, corporate image, long-term 
viability, good citizenship, and a friendly regulatory environment. See infra § 
IV.C. 
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or anti-immigration beliefs, the attitude can be said to be operating at a 
deep level. Norm entrepreneurs who seek to dislodge and replace that 
attitude must invest in claims tailored toward generating guilt and pride 
throughout a social system. For instance, pro-immigration messaging can 
be anchored in common-cause: The United States is an immigrant nation, 
its people are immigrants, and individuals who disapprove of immigration 
today have reason to feel guilty since their forebears relied, in part, on pro-
immigration attitudes to drive policy. These types of claims are more 
difficult to make in non-immigrant nations. For example, in Japan, anti-
immigration attitudes can be traced to one of its earliest recorded poems, 
which celebrated an “eightfold fence” that separated it from other lands 
and peoples.86 To the extent that norm entrepreneurs seek to shape 
prevailing attitudes toward immigration within Japanese society, they 
have to appeal to a broader cosmopolitan history that exists outside of 
Japan. Claims may go viral on the surface of a Japanese social network, 
on the basis of peer approval and disapproval, but do little toward changing 
deeply held attitudes and beliefs. In this case, greater levels of investment 
in claims are required for generating change.   
When the President uses profane language to describe a particular 
set of countries and expresses disdain for their immigrants,87 it does little 
to change existing attitudes toward immigration policy to the extent that 
American attitudes and norms operate on the surface, and are primarily 
shaped by second-party social sanctioning anchored in peer-approval and 
disapproval. In this setting, reactions to inflammatory statements that 
target the speaker and generate patterns of social sanctioning around 
immigration are based more upon a person’s alignment with the speaker 
and less upon the policy contents of the message. Contemporary rational 
deliberation, with its characteristic dryness and dearth of provocative 
rhetoric, is a relatively weak player in the world of political team sports. 
On the other hand, internalization, at least of political attitudes and beliefs, 
requires greater levels of personal reflection for which basic social media 
platforms seem poorly equipped to systemically generate.88  
                                               
86 The poem is found in the imperial anthology, Kojiki, dated to the early eighth 
century. 古事記	(KOJIKI) [RECORDS OF ANCIENT MATTERS], 396–402 (trans. 
Basil Hall Chamberlain, 2d ed., 1932) (c. 712). 
87 See Julie H. Davis, et al., Trump Alarms Lawmakers With Disparaging Words 
for Haiti and Africa, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/01/11/us/politics/trump-shithole-countries.html. 
88 This may be because they engender terse, normative messages that contain 
less content, analysis, and factual support. On the other hand, shorter messages 
may be easier to process. See LARRY SAMUELSON, EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND 
EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 24 (1998) (noting that apprehension increases with 
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It may be that prevailing American social attitudes toward 
immigration are primarily based upon social approval and disapproval 
amongst acquaintances and have little to do with internal values. For 
instance, a voter may feel little pride (or guilt) for supporting (or opposing) 
an altruistic policy that increases immigration levels from conflict- and 
disaster-stricken countries or countries with low average incomes. Any 
guilt, if present, may be outweighed by one’s identity with a chosen 
political team. In this case, a viral norm will quickly decay throughout a 
social network.   
Recall that social media platforms generally increase the density 
of social interactions.89 What does this mean for immigration? If 
immigration attitudes are primarily based upon internal values, and social 
media messaging tends to target external patterns of group approval and 
disapproval, then immigration discourse will remain relatively 
unperturbed. Norm entrepreneurs must make claims that target internal 
guilt and pride, and these types of claims are less likely to travel through 
media such as casual tweets, comments, and upvotes. Only if deep claims 
aimed at internalization take root, will guilt and pride increase, and will 
social norms and attitudes become more consistent over time. 
1. Climate Change 
This point can be clearly seen in current disagreements over why 
Americans view climate change with more skepticism than Europeans. 
Cass Sunstein has suggested that political support for combating terrorism 
is greater than support for climate change because the former is more 
salient.90 People can see the effects of terrorism and imagine themselves 
harmed. They cannot do the same for climate change. Public attitude 
surveys seem to support this claim. Latin America and Africa, two regions 
that have experienced relatively high levels of drought, are more 
concerned with climate change than other regions.91 Likewise, Australia, 
which experiences regular forest fires, maintains strong support for public 
                                               
“sufficiently simple” messaging that commands attention). 
89 See supra note 51. 
90 Cass R. Sunstein, The Availability Heuristic, Intuitive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
and Climate Change, 77 CLIMATE CHANGE 195, 195 (2006). 
91 Bruce Stokes, Richard Wike, & Jill Carle, Global Concern About Climate 
Change, Broad Support for Limiting Emissions, PEW RESEARCH CTR: GLOBAL 
ATTITUDES & TRENDS, (Nov. 5, 2015), 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/11/05/global-concern-about-climate-change-
broad-support-for-limiting-emissions/ (finding 74% and 61% of survey 
respondents in Latin America and Africa very concerned, and only 54% and 
45% of European and American respondents very concerned). 
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action.92 Salience cannot fully explain the difference in attitudes between 
the United States and Europe, however. Both regions are situated in the 
Northern Hemisphere and have been insulated from dramatic and visible 
climatic changes, but differences in concern between its citizens vary 
substantially.93  
Studies often explain these differences in terms of scientific 
literacy.94 Europeans are more knowledgeable in science, the argument 
goes, and are consequently more concerned with global warming.95 Some 
believe that more concern translates into greater levels of second-party 
enforcement. For instance, a common view is that “there is a fair bit of 
social pressure to behave in an environmentally responsible manner in 
places like Sweden.”96 In order to change American attitudes toward 
climate change then, norm entrepreneurs must invest in claims that 
increase scientific literacy. On the other hand, more recent studies 
emphasize the role of political affiliation and ideology, and build on 
                                               
92 The Climate Institute, Climate of the Nation 2016: Australian Attitudes on 
Climate Change, 
http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/COTN_2016_Executive_Su
mmary.pdf (finding that 77% of Australians believe climate change is occurring 
and continues to grow and that a majority believes the government should do 
something about it). 
93 See Stokes et al., supra note 91. 
94 Anthony Leiserowitz, et al., Climate Change in the American Mind, Yale 
Program on Climate Change Communication and George Mason University 
Center for Climate Change Communication 9–10 (2017) (finding that only 13% 
of Americans understand that there is a scientific consensus that humans cause 
global warming); van der Linden et al., The Scientific Consensus on Climate 
Change as a Gateway Belief: Experimental Evidence, 10 PLOS ONE 1, 7 (2015) 
(finding that beliefs about scientific consensus shape attitudes toward 
combatting climate change); cf. Elke C. Weber & Paul C. Stern, Public 
Understanding of Climate Change in the United States, 66 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
315, 315 (2011) (noting the difficulty in understanding climate change results in 
polarization of beliefs). 
95 Jing Shi, Knowledge as a Driver of Public Perceptions About Climate Change 
Reassessed, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 759, 759 (2016) (noting survey 
evidence of greater scientific literacy, and greater concern for climate change, in 
Europe versus the United States). But see, Dan Kahan et al., The Polarizing 
Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 
2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 732, 723 (2015) (noting that scientific literacy 
tends to polarize views because people with high literacy use it to retain and 
justify preexisting beliefs). 
96 Elisabeth Rosenthal, What Makes Europe Greener than the U.S.?  ¸YALE ENV. 
360 (Sept. 28, 2009), 
http://e360.yale.edu/features/what_makes_europe_greener_than_the_us. 
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psychological research that views politics as a team sport.97 The tension 
within this research should be clear insofar as increasing scientific literacy 
generally reduces politicization. Literacy engenders rational deliberation, 
which decreases the tendency for norms to operate exclusively on the 
surface of social networks via approval and disapproval. If social 
psychologists are correct, policy should be directed toward depoliticizing 
climate change issues, with care being paid to not inflame beliefs grounded 
in ideology.98  
It would seem that this can be accomplished at least two ways: 
increasing scientific literacy and decreasing politicized validity claims 
made over social networks. What remains unclear, however, is whether 
first- and second-party enforcement crowd each other out. In other words, 
will limiting instances of “Yay skeptics, and boo scientists” (and vice-
versa) free up space for rational thought and the emergence of guilt and 
pride? If so, then policy directed toward reducing casual social media 
communications related to climate change may, counterintuitively, 
encourage the development of deep social norms inasmuch as platform 
messaging fails to generate internal reflection and simply reinforces 
existing polarized ideologies with patterns of peer approval. 
One systemic approach is to encourage norm entrepreneurs and 
social network members to make and enforce validity claims related to 
climate change on platforms or sub-platforms that are dedicated to town-
hall-style discourse or scientific debate. In other words, modify the 
platform architecture for claims that are meant to target internalization. 
This approach, taken by Reddit, StackExchange and others, has led to a 
relatively higher quality of idea exchange and has decreased instances of 
ideological herding and trolling.99 The platform permits others to reward 
                                               
97 See, e.g., Kelly S. Fielding & Matthew J. Hornsey, A Social Identity Analysis 
of Climate Change and Environmental Attitudes and Behaviors: Insights and 
Opportunities, 7 FRONT. PSCYH. 121, 121 (2016) (noting that tensions between 
political conservatives and progressives drive differences in attitudes toward 
climate change). 
98 In other work, I have noted that lawmakers should work toward depoliticizing 
climate science and other gridlocked policies by enacting contingent rules that 
become effective only if certain scientific facts obtain. See Frank Fagan, Legal 
Cycles and Stabilization Rules, THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 11, 16–18 (Frank 
Fagan & Saul Levmore eds. 2017); Frank Fagan, Political Paralysis and Timing 
Rules, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 43, 48–50 (2016). 
99 See, e.g., How Does StackExchange Stimulate Honest, Open Discourse While 
Limiting the Effects of Trolling?, META STACKEXCHANGE, 
https://meta.stackexchange.com/questions/289629/how-does-stack-exchange-
stimulate-honest-open-discourse-while-limiting-the-effe (last visited Apr. 6, 
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the poster for exceptional participation—not so much for the content that 
they provide, but for the manner in which they provide it. Yet another 
systemic approach is to provide links to related content which articulates 
counter-arguments or places similar arguments within different 
contexts.100 By creating an atmosphere that encourages rational 
deliberation, climate change discourse can be funneled toward social 
media platform locations that foster the development of deep norms. 
2. Religious Expression (and Wedding Cake) 
As a norm moves deeper toward unconscious cognitive process, 
either because its roots are rationally forgotten or simply lost over time, 
the rationale for following its mandate becomes increasingly difficult to 
ascertain. Older rationales may evolve and merge with newer ones, be 
entirely replaced, or become confused, incoherent, or unspoken. Chaotic 
evolutions are often on display when two opposing norms conflict. 
Consider that in most Western societies today, there exists a deep norm of 
free expression of private religious beliefs. The norm is at least as old as 
the Reformation, if not older, and has been codified in many statutes and 
constitutions across Europe and the United States.101 Within many 
countries, especially Protestant ones, free expression was eventually 
interpreted as the freedom to choose one’s own religious practices. In 
order to preserve free choice for everyone, it was necessary that one’s 
personal practices did not apply to others. This led free religious 
expression to engender a norm of separation between church and state.102 
Religious freedom is rarely understood as a normative precursor for 
                                               
2018). 
100 For example, Facebook is testing the integration of its “Related Articles” 
program into Facebook News Feed. See Sara Su, New Test With Related Article, 
FACEBOOK (Apr. 25, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/04/news-feed-
fyi-new-test-with-related-articles/. Similarly, Apps like Read Across the Aisle 
nudge users toward articles that are less consistent with their political beliefs. 
See Richard Bilton, A News App Aims to Burst Filter Bubbles by Nudging 
Readers Toward a More “Balanced” Media Diet, NEIMANLAB (Mar. 9, 2017), 
http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/03/a-news-app-aims-to-burst-filter-bubbles-by-
nudging-readers-toward-a-more-balanced-media-diet/. See also note 75 for a 
description of Kialo, another platform that encourages evaluation of argument 
and counter-argument. 
101 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. 1; FRENCH DECLARATION OF HUMAN AND 
CIVIC RIGHTS, Art. 10–11 (1789). 
102 See BRAD S. GREGORY, REBEL IN THE RANKS 218, 255–56 (2017) (noting 
that separation of church and state “continues to be paradoxically enabled by the 
freedom of religion, which itself was conceived as a solution to problems 
inherited from the Reformation era”). 
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church-state separation because it presents a partial paradox: if separation 
leads to secularization of public life, then freedom of expression is 
truncated to the extent that expression takes place in public. The 
incoherence will eventually subside when the older religious expression 
norm is forgotten, discarded, or reconfigured.  
The Masterpiece Cakeshop case can be understood as a step 
toward reconfiguration, or at least an emphasis and reaffirmation of the 
importance that religious expression is free insomuch as it does not impact 
others in public life.103 Assuming that the creation of the cake is an 
expression of the baker’s religious beliefs, the benefit that he receives (his 
dignity interest) is dependent upon denying the couple service.104 When 
denied service, the couple incurs a cost (equivalent to their dignity 
interest). On the other hand, when compelled to create the cake, the couple 
receives their dignity interest, but the baker is denied his. The case might 
be easily decided if the magnitude of the parties’ dignity were observable 
and law were content to ignore the interests of society at large.105 Without 
an ability to measure the parties’ subjective valuations of dignity, law 
might consider a proxy in the form of the income the baker gives up by 
denying the couple a cake, and perhaps the economic value of a free cake 
offered to the couple by another supportive baker. Neither seems 
satisfactory. Both parties have given up something of value, and their 
sacrifices serve only to further complicate an already challenging 
evaluation of their dignity interests. It seems reasonable then, and 
necessary for maximizing social welfare, to consider the dignity interests 
                                               
103 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Col. Civil Rights Comm’n, Docket No. 16-
111 (U.S. argued Dec. 5, 2017). 
104 That the creation of the cake is a form of the baker’s religious expression is a 
key assumption on which the case could turn. The forgoing discussion considers 
the consequences of its validity. If the court finds otherwise, it might be useful 
to imagine a case where a couple asks a religious painter to symbolically paint 
their union, or some other factual scenario where creative expression contrary to 
religious belief must be compelled. 
105 See Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Segal, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based 
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2579 (2015) 
(asserting that law directs lawmakers to consider “the harms to other citizens 
that accommodating complicity-based conscience claims may inflict”). For an 
argument that cases are rarely decided strictly on the costs and benefits to the 
parties, and instead involve an assessment of the costs and benefits to society at 
large, see Frank Fagan, Renovating the Efficiency of Common Law Hypothesis, 
THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 280 (Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore eds. 2017) 
(developing a model where judges decide cases on the basis of allocative 
efficiency amongst parties and non-parties). 
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of non-parties or other societal norms and values. 
In the Piggie Park Enterprises case, where the defendant pled 
denying service as a form of religious expression, the Supreme Court 
expressly invoked the advancement of the interests of non-parties in its 
decision to award attorney fees to the plaintiff.106 Undoubtedly, the court 
based its decision on the text and purpose of civil rights legislation, but in 
doing so, it implicitly elevated a church-state separation norm above the 
norm of religious expression. The endorsement of public accommodation 
laws, when situated in similar conflicts, can also be understood as an 
affirmation of the predominance of a church-state separation norm. To the 
extent that this norm remains ascendant, it should be expected that 
religious expression will be removed from social interactions where 
dignity interests between parties are subjective, and where broader societal 
interests are implicated. Once the norm of free expression is reshaped, its 
conflict with civil rights will peter out, and it will begin its descent toward 
unconscious cognitive process unless it is called to conflict again by a 
norm entrepreneur. 
Attitudes toward immigration, climate change, and religious 
expression subsist almost entirely on internalized values. Validity claims 
that only fuel interpersonal sanctioning operate on the surface of political 
team sports and make less of an impact on the shaping of preferences and 
the construction of deeply held beliefs. Regulating social media content to 
reduce those types of claims will do little to enhance social welfare. 
Aggregate levels of approval benefits and disapproval costs will remain 
relatively unchanged since the teams are engaged in zero-sum conflict. On 
the other hand, configuring network architecture with systemic social 
media regulation so that claims are funneled toward locations where 
discursive excellence thrives, can lead to greater levels of internalization. 
Consider that Reddit, in an effort to elevate the quality of its fora, 
“shadowbans” users who come to troll.107 Traditional banning blocks the 
troll from the forum, but trolls can simply change their names and continue 
to troll. By contrast, shadowbanning blocks others from viewing the troll’s 
messages: the troll continues to troll, sees her messages, and believes she 
is still trolling. But she is speaking to an empty hall, even as she believes 
                                               
106 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (“If 
successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys’ fees, few 
aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by 
invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts.”). 
107 See Can Someone Please Explain to Me What “Shadow Banning” Is?, 
REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/11ggji/ 
can_someone_please_explain_to_me_what_shadow/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).  
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the seats are full. Policing content rarely fosters rational deliberation and 
the internalization of facts and norms. By focusing on platform 
architecture, a tendency toward group polarization can be neutralized, and 
users can be nudged with systemic measures toward network locations 
where rational deliberation proliferates.  
IV. THE REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
A.  People and the First Amendment 
The validity claims of people, lawmakers, and social media 
platforms are governed by different sets of rules even though their claims 
evolve and devolve in identical and predictable patterns. People, as norm 
entrepreneurs, make validity claims and engage in social enforcement. 
Claims, and enforcement of other people’s claims, are speech acts 
governed by the First Amendment. Various types of speech—religious, 
political, commercial, obscene, and so on—receive various degrees of 
scrutiny, but all can be profitably analyzed with the general framework 
formulated by Learned Hand and later updated by Posner.108 The essential 
idea is that law should compare the costs of forbidding speech with the 
costs of permitting it and choose the lesser of the two evils. By 
categorizing speech, law uses archetypes to identify the magnitude of costs 
in order to reach a decision. Forbidding religious or political speech, for 
instance, carries a greater cost than forbidding obscene speech. 
Conversely, permitting religious or political speech typically carries a 
lesser cost than permitting obscene speech. Religious and political speech 
can generate positive externalities by normalizing prosocial behavior and 
discourse; obscene speech can generate negative externalities by 
normalizing asocial behavior. The consideration of externalities 
introduces uncertainty: when speech is permitted, law cannot be sure that 
it will be socially costly. It must guess. Learned Hand’s formula, therefore, 
directs law to forbid speech only if the costs of forbidding it are greater 
than the probabilistic costs of permitting it.109      
Posner expands this idea by noting that the social costs of 
permitting speech may occur later in time.110 Not only should social costs 
be discounted by their probability of occurrence, but they should 
additionally be discounted by the time that they take to arrive. If Martin 
Luther were governed by the First Amendment, he surely would have been 
permitted to post the Ninety-Five Theses. Not only did they constitute 
                                               
108 See US v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 201 (5th Cir. 1950); Richard A. Posner, 
Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 2, 2 (1986). 
109 See Dennis, 183 F.2d at 201. 
110 See Posner, supra note 108 at 8. 
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high-value religious and political speech, but their disruptive effect (if 
considered a social cost) was hardly certain and took time.111 With respect 
to the reconfiguration of religious expression set in motion by the Theses, 
any social cost would have certainly approached zero, given the length of 
time needed for its development. In general, speech acts that lead to the 
development of deep norms must be so heavily discounted for time and 
uncertainty that First Amendment law would counsel against their 
prohibition. People, as norm entrepreneurs engaged in shaping the future, 
are given free reign. This makes intuitive sense. Any decision in favor of 
defendants in Masterpiece Cakeshop will surely include a heavily-
weighted rationale of the immediate social impact of permitting the baker 
to deny the couple service. This type of reasoning, while not strictly 
utilitarian, is expected from the “ideological” justices. What is interesting, 
is that the swing vote belongs to the justice who tends to engage in loose 
statements about time and tradition.112 When considering probabilistic 
costs and benefits that occur later in time, a decision is simply more 
difficult and, unsurprisingly, swings.  
Any assessment of First Amendment constraints would be 
incomplete without consideration of the costs of forbidding speech. These 
costs, which include the cost of suppressing valuable information plus any 
legal error generated from suppressing too little or too much, must be 
weighed against the social costs of permitting the information to be 
circulated. Returning to Luther, the costs of forbidding his post of the 
Ninety-Five Theses might have forestalled the development of a norm of 
religious expression and its evolution toward church-state separation. 
These costs, too, were sufficiently uncertain and would take many years 
                                               
111 See id.; see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (permitting 
advocacy of unlawful conduct unless speaker intends to incite specific unlawful 
action that is likely to result imminently). Gregory notes that Luther initially 
called for an official council to reconcile differences and that his early goals 
were aimed at mild reforms within the confines of existing law and Roman 
Catholic authority. See GREGORY, supra note 102 at 57–58. 
112 For example, in Romer v. Evans, in reference to a Colorado law that fenced 
sexual minorities out of political processes, Justice Kennedy noted that: “It is 
not within our tradition to enact laws of this sort.” 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
Comparing the approaches of Kennedy and Posner toward striking down 
prohibitions of gay marriage, Martha Nussbaum notes: “Posner’s tone is 
skeptical, caustic, intolerant of cant; Kennedy’s is solemn and lofty. Posner 
addresses concrete issues of welfare; Kennedy adduces high ethical abstractions, 
dignity and equality. Posner is punctilious in matters of argument, Kennedy 
loose and impressionistic.”  Martha C. Nussbaum, Janus-Faced Law: A 
Philosophical Debate in FRANK FAGAN & SAUL LEVMORE, THE TIMING OF 
LAWMAKING 270 (2017).   
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to incur. Quite obviously, Catholic authorities sought to suppress 
Protestant speech on the basis of its immediate effects, while reformers 
received protection from political leaders who benefitted immediately 
from agitation.113  
B.  Lawmakers and Politics 
Lawmakers, as norm entrepreneurs, face an entirely different set 
of constraints to their capacity for making claims and enforcing the claims 
of others. Because claims and social sanctions are expressed in statutes, 
regulations, and judgments, lawmaker norm entrepreneurship is primarily 
demarcated by political feasibility. For some time, legal scholarship 
generally ignored the expressive power of law, which might be attributed 
to a comfortableness with its democratic pedigree: lawmakers, especially 
legislators, are accountable to the electorate. Besides, law’s expressive 
power, when compared to law’s immediate compliance-generating power, 
seems far less important: any expressive power can easily be short-
circuited with new, countervailing rules.114 The expressive function then, 
supports the underlying purpose of a rule by transmitting additional 
information beyond the rule itself. Because lawmaking involves 
opportunity costs, that is, lawmakers must choose to spend time and 
political capital on one rule versus another, grant certiorari, or develop 
particular regulations at the expense of others, lawmaking inherently 
conveys information about societal priorities. In addition, the public and 
participatory nature of lawmaking strengthens the salience of its object. 
Laws that are difficult to enforce because detection is costly express values 
which encourage victims to speak out; and laws that address social wrongs 
that affect a small number of people suggest a need for heightened public 
attention. In other cases, law might focalize a method for social 
coordination. But whatever the form it takes, legal expression is 
circumscribed by lawmakers’ ability to pronounce law.  
                                               
113 See GREGORY, supra note 102 at 53–54 (noting that the protection of 
reformers was used as leverage in negotiations with Catholic authorities). 
114 Of course legal scholars did not entirely ignore the expressive function of 
law, but earlier articulations were more clearly formulated by sociologists. For 
instance, in his History of Sexuality, Foucault stated:  
I do not mean to say that the fades into the background or that the 
institutions of justice tend to disappear, but rather law operates more and 
more as a norm, and that the judicial institution is increasingly 
incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, 
and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory. 
FOUCAULT, supra note 20 at 144. 
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C.  Social Media Platforms and Regulation 
The most apparent difference amongst people, lawmakers, and 
social media platforms is that people and lawmakers directly create 
content. Platforms are more like plumbers. They adjust their algorithms to 
control the flow of what their users see. By controlling the flow, social 
media platforms determine which validity claims are made over their 
networks and can exert meaningful control over patterns of approval, 
disapproval, pride, and guilt. For instance, Google Analytics closely 
tracked which issues its users fact-checked during the Obama-Romney 
presidential debates.115 By tracking “who was searching what” during the 
debate, Google was able to deliver highly segmented advertising 
impressions of its users who had demonstrated, by means of their search 
histories, an elevated interest in a particular issue.116 This is a clear 
example of a platform indirectly determining the contents of claims. Once 
these advertisements and other forms of claim-making are linked to 
engagement and amplification platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, 
users initiate patterns of social sanctioning. These patterns, too—of 
necessity—are controlled by the platforms. Social media users face 
opportunity costs of viewing and enforcing claims. They can only act on a 
limited number of messages. For this reason, social media platforms must 
limit and curate the messages that their users see. News stories, 
accompanying comments, and other forms of content are categorized and 
triaged. A user who checks the first few items of a news feed or Twitter 
account routinely ignores the items buried toward the bottom. Choice 
architecture and nudging are the natural outcomes of tailoring essentially 
limitless media to individual user profiles and characteristics. 
The selection and prioritization of social media items, though 
algorithmically obscured, can be understood as motivated by profit and 
other managerial interests, which can sometimes present conflicts internal 
                                               
115 Google Analytics, Case Study, Obama for America Uses Google Analytics to 
Democratize Rapid, Data-Driven Decision Making (2013) 
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//intl/hr_ALL/a
nalytics/customers/pdfs/obama-2012.pdf. 
116 To the extent that Google Analytics was unable to identify which user was 
searching a particular issue, say, because a user was searching anonymously, 
then Google might be able to identify which issues were important to users from 
a particular geographic location by analyzing IP addresses. As noted in the case 
study, tailoring and directing messages on the basis of geography was critical for 
victory: “The results from Election Day speak for themselves: a resounding 
victory, with nearly every battleground state falling into the President’s column. 
[Data analytics has been credited] for providing much of the winning margin.” 
Id. 
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to the social media platform itself. These internal conflicts among 
managerial interests stand in contrast to the gubernatorial interests of the 
state.117 To the extent that platforms engage in content moderation and 
censorship, they exercise quasi-judicial governance functions that can, in 
some cases, satisfy state preferences; however, this satisfaction is the 
outcome of alignment between platform and state interests.  
For instance, when YouTube considers the removal of a terrorist 
recruitment video, it is considering a First Amendment question and 
exercising quasi-judicial power. It is obvious that managerial and 
gubernatorial interests can overlap. YouTube’s profitability, corporate 
image, long-term viability, and capacity to avoid regulation depend on 
satisfactory operation of its quasi-judicial function. If YouTube fails to 
remove the video, its corporate image may decline, its users may go 
elsewhere, and the state may impose costly regulations. Inasmuch as 
managerial and gubernatorial interests strongly converge, there exists a 
good case for self-regulation.118 Where they diverge, rules are desirable so 
long as their benefits exceed their costs. 
This point is clearly seen in recent German legislation aimed at 
enforcing, on social media platforms used within Germany, speech content 
restrictions that were set in place there following the Second World 
War.119 Embedded in Germany’s federal criminal code are prohibitions 
against the “use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations” unless for 
“art or science, research or teaching;” speech that incites treason or other 
crimes; threats to commit various crimes; incitement to hatred, including 
through the dissemination of written materials; depictions of violence; and 
defamation of religions or religious and ideological organizations.120  
Most social media platforms are globally sprawled and vast. Their 
                                               
117 See Balkin, supra note 13 at 1153  (2018) (noting that platforms engage in 
content moderation, which amounts to private governance); Klonick, supra note 
13 at 1662 (referring to private content platforms as systems of governance). 
118 If platforms are unable or otherwise lack competence to carry out their 
overlapping interests, then their interests can be understood as insufficiently 
strong or weakly overlapping. 
119 Bundestag, An Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks 
(July 12, 2017) https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/ 
Dokumente/NetzDG_engl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. For the original 
version, see Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, 61 BUNDESGAZETZBLATT 3352–55 
(2017) http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk= 
Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl117s3352.pdf. 
120 German Criminal Code § 86, 91, 111 100a, 111, 126, 130, 131, 140, 166, 
184b. 
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managerial interests often fail to sufficiently overlap with localized 
gubernatorial interests such as Germany’s.121 Facing insufficient 
convergence, Germany cannot expect platforms to self-regulate in its 
interest. Moreover, Germany’s benefit from the regulation is large because 
it enhances enforcement of an easily identifiable and constitutionally 
settled content restriction. Perhaps more importantly, the benefit is 
delivered with little cost to the state inasmuch as it relies on private citizens 
for its enforcement. Platforms with more than two million users in 
Germany must provide the public with “an easily accessible process” for 
registering complaints of illegal content directly with the platform.122 For 
content that is “manifestly unlawful” the rule requires the platform to 
block access within twenty-four hours. For content that is simply 
“unlawful”, the platform must block access within seven days unless “the 
unlawfulness of the content is dependent on the falsity of a factual 
allegation or is clearly dependent on other factual circumstances” or the 
platform “refers the decision regarding unlawfulness to a [lawfully] 
recognized self-regulation institution . . . and agrees to accept the decision 
of that institution.”123 If a platform receives more than 100 complaints per 
year, it must comply with various reporting requirements.124 Users and 
members of the public who remain unsatisfied with the outcome of the 
complaint procedure, either because the platform is unresponsive, or they 
disagree with its decision, may file an online complaint with the German 
Department of Justice.125 Without sufficiently strong convergence of 
managerial and gubernatorial interests, Germany chose to develop a rule 
that leverages average internet users for its enforcement and limits the 
general reporting requirements of platforms to aggregate and serious 
problems.  
Note that this rule loosely tracks the Restatement approach to 
communication tort liability of distributors. Only if a platform is alerted of 
unlawful content and refuses to block it, can a user proceed to the German 
Department of Justice with the complaint.126 By providing for notice-based 
                                               
121 Cf. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. 
Supp. 1181, 1184 (2001) (noting that a French court found that Yahoo! violated 
§ R645-1 of the French Criminal Code by permitting French users to purchase 
Nazi paraphernalia through its globally accessible website). 
122 Social Network Enforcement Act § 3.3.2 
123 Id. at § 3.2.3(a)–(b). 
124 Id. at § 2. 
125 See Bundesamt für Justiz [Federal Office of Justice],  
https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/Themen/Buergerdienste/NetzDG/Service/F
ormulare/Formulare_node.html (last visited May 3, 2018). 
126 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
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liability, the rule avoids the complications presented by later decisions 
such as Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., which held 
distributors liable if they relied on automated editorial control.127 Where it 
parts ways with American law, and in particular § 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act,128 is that it prioritizes the gubernatorial 
interests of the state in content restrictions over the managerial interests of 
the platform such as content proliferation or cost minimization of 
aggressive enforcement.  
On the other hand, scholars and courts have recognized that the 
immunity provision of § 230 encourages platforms to be good citizens, and 
remove offensive material, because they will not be held liable as editors 
if they do; and § 230 promotes free speech and e-commerce because 
platform immunity nurtures platform growth.129 While some scholars have 
suggested that recognition of cyber civil rights should circumvent 
immunity, the regulatory benefit from speech suppression is clearer in 
Germany because specific content restrictions are codified.130 In the 
United States, regulatory benefits must be developed by constitutional 
interpretation. Moreover, benefits can be interpreted to move in the 
opposite direction because the absence of regulation prioritizes a 
constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech. Only if the normative 
conflict is settled, will the gubernatorial interests of the state become 
clear.131 For now, the state can avoid settling the conflict by allowing 
                                               
liability to distributors if they know or should have known of the defamation). 
127 1995 WL 323710 *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (finding distributor liable as a 
publisher because it sought “to gain the benefits of editorial control” through 
automated content filtering and user guidelines for posting and that it “uniquely 
arrogated to itself the role of determining what is proper for its members to post 
and read on its bulletin boards.”). 
128 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c). 
129 See Klonick, supra note 13 at 1607 (cataloging court decisions and 
scholarship). 
130 On cyber civil rights, see Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. 
L. REV. 61 (2009). Other rationales suggesting that the benefits of regulation are 
large include: cyberspace amplifies speech harms, especially sexual harassment; 
the anonymity of cyberspace has caused hate speech to go mainstream; and 
online harassment, bullying, and revenge pornography have proliferated. See 
Klonick, supra note 13 at *1614. 
131 This conflict has been present since the Founding. In argument against the 
Sedition Act of 1798, James Madison noted:  
[T]he unconstitutional power exercised over the press by the Sedition 
Act ought, more than any other, to produce universal alarm; because it is 
levelled against that right of freely examining public characters and 
measures, and of free communication among the people thereon, which 
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platforms to privately balance free speech values with other social goals 
such as robust security and the discouragement of hate speech. If the 
platforms do too much and thus infringe upon First Amendment principles, 
or too little and consequently degrade security and civil rights, the state 
can intervene. Where platform action converges with state preferences, a 
self-regulation model should prevail. It should be clear that platforms have 
some room to maneuver, so long as the gubernatorial interests of the state 
remain weakly defined. The state has room to maneuver inasmuch as it 
systemically regulates social media and avoids directly combatting speech 
acts. 
The short- and medium-term profitability of platforms generally 
increases with their size and the presence of an unfettered legal 
environment. If users are unhappy with unmoderated content, they may go 
elsewhere. If the state is unhappy, it may impose rules. Indeed, much like 
lawmakers, platforms are accountable to the demands of their users and to 
broader political feasibility. Platforms accordingly intensify self-
regulation up to the point where its marginal benefit equals its marginal 
cost. Setting an optimal content moderation policy maximizes the volume 
of content by balancing aggregate user engagement and alienation while 
avoiding costly state interference. Generally, if judges or legislators 
shoehorn social media platforms into paradigmatic company towns, 
television broadcasters, newspaper editors, municipal utilities, or 
governance institutions, it will likely be the result of a means-end 
instrumentalism for subsuming divergent managerial interests within 
broader societal concerns.132  
As norm entrepreneurs, large platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and 
                                               
has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other 
right. 
James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800) Writings 6:385-
401, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/ 
amendI_speechs24.html. 
132 Company towns are functionally equivalent to state actors and must 
guarantee First Amendment rights. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502–
03 (1945). Because radio and television broadcasters monopolize frequency 
spectrums, there exists a public right to suitable access and regulators are 
justified in requiring broadcasters to present both sides of public issues. See Red 
Lion Broad Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Newspaper editors receive 
protection to decide the contents of their newspapers. See Miami Herald Pub. 
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). On platforms as utilities, see Packingham 
v. North Carolina 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (holding that preventing users from 
accessing social media platforms is a denial of a First Amendment right opening 
the door to treat platforms as quasi-utilities). 
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Twitter can develop longer-term projects delimited by prevailing social 
norms and political possibility. A freedom to pursue long-term managerial 
interests through norm entrepreneurship is consistent with First 
Amendment principles because an outcome must be deeply discounted by 
the uncertainty of its success and the time it takes to achieve it. Any 
justification for the limitation of platform construction of deep norms must 
be met with new law or creative lawyering. From a social welfare 
perspective, pursuit of deep norms remains unproblematic. Creating them, 
and eliciting habitual compliance, relies on the free choice of people to 
engage in internalization. In a world where the formation of political 
attitudes and beliefs are more like team sports, platforms cannot shape 
electoral outcomes insomuch as social facts and falsehoods matter little. 
On the other hand, platforms direct the flow of political messaging and can 
nudge users toward network locations where higher-quality political 
discourse is the norm.133 If nudging decreases polarization costs, it may be 
worthwhile. While First Amendment doctrine circumscribes direct speech 
restrictions, the systemic regulation of platform architecture is more likely 
to survive constitutional scrutiny. In any case, platforms appear to be 
leading the way here in terms of developing creative architectures and 
implementing them, though one could imagine sustained divergence and 
the need for state action in the future.134  
CONCLUSION 
Social facts, norms, and falsehoods proliferate because of the actions 
of people and the architecture of platforms. Inasmuch as regulation is 
desirable, law should focus on systemic adjustment and reconfiguration of 
platform architecture and avoid targeting and suppressing speech contents. 
Rules that shape the contours of the forum, and the manner in which 
speech acts proliferate, can nudge speakers toward social media platform 
locations where discursive excellence thrives. Whether social media can 
be analogized to public utilities, company towns, broadcasters, newspaper 
editors, or governance institutions—and regulated accordingly—is 
important only to the extent that one of these models adequately aligns the 
managerial interests of the platform with the gubernatorial interests of the 
state. To the extent that these interests are already aligned, a self-regulation 
                                               
133 See supra note 99–100 and accompanying text. 
134 It should be clear that this Article focuses on content moderation and speech 
restrictions and sets aside for future work questions of private law. Inasmuch as 
platforms are violating end-user agreements or failing to take efficient 
precaution to safeguard user data, private contract and tort law claims may be 
enough to force platforms to internalize the external costs that these violations 
and breaches create. If not, then a case may be made for intervention. 
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model should prevail. Where they diverge, a case can be made for 
intervention. 
